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CYBERSECURITY OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN THE 
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR: AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATORY 
AND PRIVATE LAW APPROACHES WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
NEEDED REFORMS 
Jeanne C. Suchodolski, JD, LLM 
The past twenty-five years gave rise to increasing levels of 
automation within the transportation sector. From initial 
subsystems, like vessel satellite tracking and automobile chassis 
control, automation continues apace. The future promises fully 
autonomous devices such as unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”) and 
self-driving cars (“UAV”). These autonomous and automatic 
systems and devices (“AASD”) provide safety, efficiency, and 
productivity benefits. Yet AASD operate under continual threat of 
cyber-attack. 
Compromised AASD can produce dire consequences in the 
transportation sector. The possible consequences extend far beyond 
financial harms to severe bodily injury or even death. Given both 
the prevalence of cyber threats and their potentially deadly 
consequences, the public holds a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
incentives exist to address the cybersecurity of such systems. 
This paper examines both the private and public law 
mechanisms for influencing AASD cybersecurity behaviors in the 
transportation sector; and undertakes the first comprehensive 
comparison of existing agency regulatory schemes. The findings 
presented herein propose: (1) additional legislation to promote 
sharing of cyber event data; and (2) transportation sector 
regulatory best practices that require mandatory submission and 
review of cybersecurity plans by OEMs and service providers when 
compromise of their products or services threatens safety of life or 
critical infrastructure. None of the recommendations advanced 
herein require regulators to direct the adoption of any specific 
technical solution or specific cybersecurity standard. Thus, industry 
participants can remain nimble in the face of evolving cyber threats, 
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while ensuring public safety through what proves to be needed 
regulatory oversight. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, stated 
in recent testimony before Congress that the United States public 
and private sectors are at continual risk of cyber-attack from both 
nation state and non-nation state actors.1  Coats stressed that the 
threats “will increase in the next year and beyond as billions more 
digital devices are connected—with relatively little built-in 
security . . . .”2 Emerging technologies and novel applications of 
available technologies have the potential to threaten the nation’s 
infrastructure, including the transportation sector.3 
The past twenty-five years ushered in ever-increasing levels of 
automation within the transportation sector. From initial 
applications like ship and aircraft systems monitoring, to automobile 
traction control; automation continues apace. Current automatic 
systems now include more complex capabilities such as the ability 
to parallel park semi-autonomously.4 Future systems promise fully 
autonomous unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”) and self-driving 
cars. These automated and autonomous systems and devices 
(“AASD”) have the potential to significantly improve safety while 
providing benefits in efficiency and productivity. Yet, compromised 
AASD can produce dire consequences in the transportation sector. 
                                                
 1 Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 16–17 (2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director 
of National Intelligence), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
115shrg28947/pdf/CHRG-115shrg28947.pdf. 
 2 Id. at 16. 
 3 Id. at 23. 
 4 Aaron Turpen, How self-parking car technology works: the first step to 
autonomous vehicles, NEW ATLAS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://newatlas.com/how-
self-parking-works/46684/. 
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These consequences extend far beyond financial harms to severe 
bodily injury or even death. Given both the prevalence of cyber 
threats and their potential safety of life consequences, the public has 
a legitimate interest in ensuring that the legal system includes 
mechanisms that address AASD cybersecurity. 
According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, 
there are more than 50 federal laws relating to cybersecurity.5 By the 
government’s own admission, no overarching structural framework 
or organizing principles exist to unify this preponderance of 
legislation into a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity.6 The 
majority of existing legislation seeks to secure the administrative 
systems, intelligence gathering, and defense capabilities of the 
United States. An additional subset of federal law delegates to 
specialized agencies, either directly or through broader more 
comprehensive mandates, the responsibility for oversight of non-
federal critical infrastructure as well as for other non-federal sector-
specific activities. 
                                                
 5 ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING 
TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 2–3 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf; 
CALEB WATNEY & CYRIL DRAFFIN, R STREET POLICY NO. 118, ADDRESSING 
NEW CHALLENGES IN AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY 7 (2017), 
https://www.bafuture.org/sites/default/files/key-topics/attachments/ 
Addressing%20Automotive%20Cybersecurity%20Nov%202017.pdf. 
 6 FISHER, supra note 5, at 2. 
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Figure 1 contains a simplified depiction of federal agency 
cybersecurity responsibilities, created by the Congressional 
Research Service.7 As seen in the Figure, under current law all 
federal agencies have responsibility for securing their own systems. 
In the private sector, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
serves as the primary civil-sector cybersecurity agency. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) develops 
cybersecurity standards and guidelines, while sub-agencies within 
the Department of Transportation and DHS retain responsibility for 
their sector-specific regulatory charges. In addition, the White 
House, through Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, can 
and does instruct federal agencies on specific cybersecurity actions 
and launches other cybersecurity improvements and initiatives. 
In view of the escalating frequency and severity of cybersecurity 
breaches, and the cumbersome and disordered array of federal 
regulations designed to deal with them, many have called for 
legislative reform and additional regulatory oversight of the private 
                                                
 7 Id. at 4. 
Figure 1: A Simplified Diagram Illustrating Agency 
Responsibilities for Regulating Cybersecurity 
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sector.8 Others argue that any such additional legislation and 
regulation is not only unnecessary, but likely to stifle innovation, 
introduce expensive and unnecessary overhead, and hinder access to 
beneficial goods and services.9 Furthermore, logic suggests that 
regulatory intervention need not be necessary if private legal 
incentives for the desired cybersecurity behaviors already exist. 
In at least one sector, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (“NHTSA”) and its constituency has allied itself 
with the latter view, eschewing formal regulation of the cyber risks 
inherent with autonomous vehicles and espousing, instead, the use 
of optional industry guidelines.10 Other agencies, such as the U.S. 
Coast Guard, adopt a slightly more aggressive posture: mandating 
certain cybersecurity related actions, while not specifying in detail 
the exact composition of those actions.11 
This paper examines private and public law mechanisms to 
encourage AASD cybersecurity in the transportation sector. The 
analysis of private law mechanisms investigates the effectiveness of 
contractual agreements, insurance products, and product liability 
laws in influencing cybersecurity behaviors. The analysis of public 
law focuses primarily on regulations. Regulations are the tactical 
implementation of the broader statutory authority from which they 
derive and define the specific, detailed actions AASD providers and 
users must take. Furthermore, as illustrated by the NHTSA, statutory 
authority to regulate does not necessarily lead to the promulgation 
of regulations. 
                                                
 8 See id. at 4–7. 
 9 See, e.g., WATNEY & DRAFFIN, supra note 5, at 11. 
 10 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT 
HS 812 442, AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY 1 (2017), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-
ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf. 
 11 See Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 05-17; Guidelines for 
Addressing Cyber Risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 
Regulated Facilities, 82 Fed. Reg. 32189 (proposed Jul. 12, 2017). See generally 
33 C.F.R. pt. 105. 
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II.  AN OVERVIEW OF AASD AND THEIR USE IN THE 
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 
AASD may comprise an entire vehicle, or a self-contained 
component or subsystem thereof. The degree of automation within 
AASD spans a wide range. At their least complex, AASD involve 
the simple automatic monitoring of a component or subsystem: for 
example, the tire pressure sensor and its companion alert system on 
a car. At their most complex, AASD include completely 
autonomous operations like self-driving cars. Between these two 
extremes lies automatic and autonomous systems such as flight 
management computers, ships’ autopilots, and the vehicle chassis 
control used to manage road handling. The principal distinctions 
between an automatic system and an autonomous system are the 
degree of complexity and the impact on the overall operation and 
conduct of the apparatus of which it forms a part. For purposes of 
this paper, an automatic system, subsystem, component, or device is 
one capable of operating without external control or intervention 
(e.g. a tire pressure warning light), while an autonomous system is 
self-governing with logic that enables decision making independent 
of human intervention (e.g. an unmanned aircraft that delivers 
packages to your doorstep).12 The consequences of a cyberattack 
depends in part upon the degree of automation as well as the 
function of the device or system automated. 
AASD may be pre-programmed and exist independently of any 
external communications network. In contemporary applications, 
such configurations are becoming less and less common. The logic 
incorporated into AASD is often queried for stored information or 
periodically connected to external devices for the purposes of 
                                                
 12 See generally SOC’Y OF AUTO. ENG’RS INT’L, J3016 201806, SURFACE 
VEHICLE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS 
RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES 2 
(2018) (describing six levels of motor vehicle automation, ranging from no 
automation (level 0) to full driving automation (level 5)). While the cited source 
is in the specific context of motor vehicles, the definition provided above in the 
text is applicable to all devices and operations. For purposes of this paper it is only 
necessary to understand that the degree and complexity of automation may vary 
and that a distinction exists between an autonomous device and an automatic 
function.  
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performing updates and installing software patches. In the 
transportation sector, AASD also frequently receive inputs needed 
for their operation via communications links. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows a top-level network architecture for connected 
AASD consisting of three segments: an end-user segment, a 
communications segment, and a control segment. The end-user 
segment includes automobiles, trucks, airplanes, ships, and the 
people who operate them. More specifically, the end-user segment 
includes a network node with equipment that transmits, receives, 
processes, and stores system data for use by the AASD or a human 
end user. 
 The communications segment, which may be comprised of a 
satellite communications network, a terrestrial wireless network, or 
a combination thereof, routes data and information to and from a 
data source or control facility and the AASD. When the 
communications segment includes satellite-based navigation, data, 
or communications services, the communications segment also 
includes space-based communications nodes. These space-based 
communications nodes comprise the satellite constellation and the 
onboard payload(s) that transmit and route data and information 
traffic. When the AASD communications segment includes a 
Figure 1: AASD Network Architecture 
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cellular wireless communications network, the communications 
segment nodes comprise wireless cell towers, hotspots, or other 
wireless cellular equipment. 
The third and final AASD network segment, the control 
segment, combines several functions distinct from the AASD end-
user or the communications backbone itself. The control segment 
includes any terrestrial data source that supplies information to the 
AASD via the communications segment. The control segment also 
includes any terrestrial facility that monitors network configuration, 
bandwidth, power, and antennae as necessary to comply with the 
service objectives and licensing obligations of the satellite or 
cellular network. Some AASD applications, for example an 
autonomous vehicle, also employ a staffed control center to actively 
monitor AASD system performance. In critical situations, the 
control center can directly intervene in AASD operations or render 
assistance as appropriate.13 In more common, less urgent situations, 
the control center collects information about any observed 
performance aberrations or software vulnerabilities and provides 
software updates to the end user segment.14 
Whether AASD exist as discrete items or within a larger 
connected network, their componentry, operation, and 
communications backbones are all subject to cyber-attack. For ease 
of discussion, these attack vulnerabilities can be aggregated and 
summarized as follows: 
a) Disruption or suppression of the radio frequency signals 
transmitted between AASD network nodes, 
b) Compromising the integrity of the information conveyed 
between AASD nodes by altering the content, embedding content, 
or intercepting content, and 
c) Compromising the internal operation of equipment such as, 
for example, data storage and retrieval tasks, or the communications 
functions executed at an AASD node. 
Ironically, the increasing sophistication of AASD leave them 
even more susceptible to these attack vectors and exacerbates the 
                                                
 13 WATNEY & DRAFFIN, supra note 5, at 2–4. 
 14 Id. 
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resulting consequences. Inclusion of a greater number of machine-
to-machine communications, interconnectivity, and autonomous 
operations reduces human oversight. As a result, unauthorized 
intrusions become more difficult to detect, and response 
interventions more difficult to effect than in previous designs. The 
growing proliferation of AASD also provides ever more access 
points through which harm can be wreaked. 
Providers of AASD must now also manage the quality and 
security of constituent items provided by multi-national sources via 
a global logistics chain. Shared service models and the outsourcing 
of key operations add to the complex and interlocking nature of the 
modern supply chain. Numerous parties thus contribute to the design 
and operation of modern-day AASD. As the number of participants 
in AASD logistic chains grow, so too do the system vulnerabilities.15 
Recent documented incidents leave no doubt that these 
vulnerabilities exist in reality and not as theoretical abstractions. A 
study reported in the MIT Technology Review documented the 
spoofing of shipboard Automatic Identification Systems (“AIS”) to 
make fake vessels appear, real ships disappear, and to issue false 
emergency alerts.16 An August 2017 report by BBC News 
documented numerous attacks on shipboard systems, including one 
where a hacker hacked into the satellite communications of a tanker 
ship at sea.17 Although the hacker, a cybersecurity researcher, did no 
damage, the opportunity existed to alter software in the 
communications link, manipulate the ship’s position reporting, or 
infect with malware the other shipboard systems connected to that 
network.18 
                                                
 15 See DAVID LIVINGSTONE & PATRICIA LEWIS, SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER 
FOR CYBERSECURITY? 13–15 (2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites 
/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22-space-final-frontier-
cybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf. 
 16 Tom Simonite, Ship Tracking Hack Makes Tankers Vanish from View, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520421/ship-
tracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/. 
 17 Chris Baraniuk, How Hackers are Targeting the Shipping Industry, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40685821. 
 18 Id. 
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Cybersecurity incidents are not just limited to the maritime 
industry. In October of 2014, the weather satellite network of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration suffered a 
disruption in service mere months after the OIG issued a report 
outlining the agency’s vulnerability to attack.19 At the 2017 
CyberSat Summit in Tysons Corner, Virginia, experts from the 
Department of Homeland Security admitted they wirelessly hacked 
into the Department’s own Boeing 757 aircraft while it sat on a 
tarmac.20 A recent article by JC Reindl of the Detroit Free Press 
summarized the history of automobile cyber-hacks and admonished 
readers via the headline: “Car hacking remains a very real threat as 
autos become ever more loaded with tech.”21 
AASD are thus becoming increasingly embedded in the global 
infrastructure, actual attacks are occurring, and evolving system 
attributes are making cyber threats more likely. Yet, market forces 
and technological advancements are discouraging, rather than 
encouraging, the rigorous confrontation of these threats. The rapid 
pace of innovation makes certain markets highly competitive. In 
those markets, providers must constantly innovate and provide new 
                                                
 19 NOAA Confirms Cyberattack ‘in Recent Weeks,’ NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2014, 
8:28 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/noaa-confirms-cyberattack-
recent-weeks-n247446. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., OIG-14-025-A, SIGNIFICANT SECURITY DEFICIENCIES IN NOAA’S 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS CREATE RISKS IN ITS NATIONAL CRITICAL MISSION 
(2014), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-14-025-A.pdf; OFFICE 
OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OIG-16-043-A, SUCCESSFUL 
CYBER ATTACK HIGHLIGHTS LONGSTANDING DEFICIENCIES IN NOAA’S IT 
SECURITY PROGRAM (2016), https://www.oig.doc.gov/ OIGPublications/OIG-16-
043-A.pdf (finding that systems were vulnerable to attack because the weakness 
identified in the previous report had not been addressed, and also evaluating the 
agency’s subsequent response to the attack). 
 20 Calvin Biesecker, Boeing 757 Testing Shows Airplanes Vulnerable to 
Hacking, DHS Says, AVIONICS INT’L (Nov. 8, 2017), 
http://www.aviationtoday.com/2017/11/08/boeing-757-testing-shows-airplanes-
vulnerable-hacking-dhs-says/. 
 21 JC Reindl, Car hacking remains a very real threat as autos become ever more 
loaded with tech, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2018, 1:56 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/01/14/car-hacking-remains-very-
real-threat-autos-become-ever-more-loaded-tech/1032951001/. 
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offerings to remain viable.22 The imposition of additional design 
requirements to address cybersecurity issues can retard the 
deployment of new capabilities and the exploitation of first-to-
market opportunities.23 
For these reasons, the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) argues that the communications industry’s cybersecurity 
practices fall short due to market failures.24 In a report dated January 
17, 2017, and issued prior to the current administration, the FCC 
cited evidence of three distinct types of market failures contributing 
to underinvestment in internet cybersecurity.25 The first of these 
failures notes that imperfect information exists among network 
operators and system users. Network operators often lack 
information about attacks experienced by others and the 
effectiveness of deployed solutions in responding to those attacks.26 
The second notes that investment in cybersecurity practices varies 
as a function of market power. Markets with minimal competition 
leave consumers with little choice but to purchase services from a 
given provider regardless of the level of cyber-threat protection. 27 
Conversely, as noted above, robust competition may penalize those 
who invest time and resources into cybersecurity by delaying 
introduction of their offerings into fast-moving markets. Finally, the 
FCC notes that cybersecurity best practices have both positive and 
negative externalities that disincentivize both service providers and 
end users from engaging in optimal levels of cyber countermeasures 
and behaviors.28 The burgeoning Internet of Things (“IoT”) and 
autonomous systems markets only exacerbate this investment 
shortfall as the negative externalities imposed upon third parties by 
                                                
 22 See LIVINGSTONE & LEWIS, supra note 15, at 12. 
 23 Id. 
 24 DAVID SIMPSON, PUB. SAFETY & HOMELAND SEC. BUREAU, FCC, 
CYBERSECURITY RISK REDUCTION 40–51 (2017), https://insidecybersecurity 
.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/jan2017/cs2017_0017.pdf. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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cyber events provide little incentive for providers to avoid them.29 
While the FCC study focused specifically on the communications 
industry, the market failure issues and concerns raised therein are 
equally applicable to the larger AASD context. 
Nonetheless, most transportation and communications industry 
segments do not believe dealing with cybersecurity threats requires 
additional legislation or regulation.30 Industry participants argue 
many of the cybersecurity risks inherent in AASD can be mitigated 
via thoughtful engineering and design, personnel and vendor 
policies, and operations protocols as a matter of best practice. A 
significant subset of AASD providers additionally point to the dual-
use nature of their product and service offerings. As suppliers to the 
federal government, these providers must satisfy the government’s 
stringent security requirements, and therefore security in the private 
sector benefits without needing to impose additional oversight.31 
The need for some sort of effective incentive to maintain cyber-
vigilance and thwart attacks is of even greater importance in the 
transportation sector than in other portions of the economy. Unlike 
hacking of credit cards, personal information, or other data breaches, 
hacks of AASD can inflict bodily harm—even fatalities. The harms 
that can result from AASD breaches in the transportation sector thus 
are not limited to the financial. The systems on which AASD are 
                                                
 29 Id. See Eli Dourado & Jerry Brito, Is There a Market Failure In 
Cybersecurity?, MERCATUS: TECH. POL’Y (Mar. 6, 2012), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/there-market-failure-cybersecurity, for a 
discussion of market failures and externalities in the cybersecurity context. 
 30 See, e.g., Cybersecurity, TELECOMM. INDUS. ASSOC., 
https://www.tiaonline.org/what-we-do/advocacy/policy-issues/cybersecurity/ 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2018) (stating that “[r]igid regulatory requirements cannot 
keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies and threats and require industry to 
comply with obsolete security requirements rather than addressing real-time 
threats, effectively making systems less secure”); see also Eric Kulisch, 
Cybersecurity push may tie up autonomous-car legislation: Automakers, senators 
at odds over best approach, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (June 24, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20170624/OEM11/170629894/cybersecurity-
autonomous-legislation-sen-markey (describing automakers’ resistance to 
proposed cybersecurity legislation). 
 31 See Pete Roney, Chief Innovations Officer, Thales, Address at the 
Economist’s A New Space Age Conference: The Data Race (Nov. 9, 2017). 
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employed carry persons on highways, through the air, and on the 
high seas. Their failure not only impacts these direct users but also 
the third-party bystander crossing the street, or child playing in a 
yard.32 Often, the conversations surrounding the need for 
cybersecurity regulations trigger an all or nothing debate, and fail to 
recognize the distinctions between the degrees of automation, the 
severity of the consequences, and the resulting sliding scale of 
damage. Depending on the severity of consequences and safety of 
life considerations, different levels of regulatory oversight might be 
warranted. 
This paper explores how existing private law mechanisms and 
public law mechanisms promote cybersecurity behaviors and 
motivate transportation sector AASD providers and users to take 
actions that reduce the risk and consequences of cyber-threats. More 
specifically, this paper explores the effectiveness of the following 
private law risk allocation mechanisms: contract law, insurance, and 
product liability. The effectiveness of these private law mechanisms, 
if sufficient, may obviate the need for formal regulation. 
Conversely, if these private law measures are weak or relatively 
ineffective at promoting cybersecurity behaviors, regulation is 
warranted as a matter of public safety. This paper also surveys the 
existing U.S. regulations that impact transportation sector 
cybersecurity and evaluates the manner in which current regulations 
promote the desired behaviors. From the entirety of this analysis, the 
appropriateness of (and opportunities for) additional legislation or 
private law solutions emerge. 
                                                
 32 See, e.g., Aarian Marshall & Alex Davies, Uber’s Self Driving Car Saw the 
Woman It Killed, Report Says, WIRED (May 24, 2018, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-driving-crash-arizona-ntsb-report/ 
(describing the fatal collision of a self-driving car with a third-party pedestrian 
walking a bicycle). Although this tragic accident did not result from a 
cybersecurity breach, the event demonstrates that third parties are potential 
victims when AASD malfunction or behave in unanticipated ways. 
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III.   PRIVATE LAW MECHANISMS FOR INFLUENCING 
AASD CYBERSECURITY 
Private law mechanisms that encourage manufacturers and 
service providers to undertake cybersecurity behaviors include: 
(a) Contractual agreements, 
(b) Use of Cover, and 
(c) Tort law via product liability. 
The sub-sections below examine each in turn. 
A. Contractual Agreements 
Parties procuring or supplying AASD will always do so under 
some sort of written agreement that allocates the risk of 
cybersecurity events amongst the contracting parties. In two of the 
three markets considered, marine and aviation, a large mass market 
does not exist, making it difficult to examine a sample agreement or 
ascertain the relative bargaining strength of the supplier and 
consumer of services. Both parties to this type of transaction are 
likely to be highly sophisticated; and the manner in which AASD 
are operated and procured likely puts both parties in a position to 
efficiently mitigate certain types of potential harms. For example, a 
ship owner may be in the best position to reduce the risks stemming 
from any compromise of shipboard earth stations by adopting 
prudent watch standing practices, while the service provider is in the 
best position to mitigate the risks associated with data corruption by 
patching known software vulnerabilities. 
However, in typical contracting terms, the AASD provider 
usually disclaims all financial harms such as incidental and 
consequential damages, as well as disclaiming all warranties.33 
Typical terms also severely limit the ability to recover damages.34 
Only with extreme difficulty or significant bargaining power will 
even a sophisticated purchaser of AASD be able to substantially 
revise such provisions. Thus, sales and support agreements are 
                                                
 33 See MICHAEL OVERLY & JAMES KALYVAS, SOFTWARE AGREEMENTS LINE 
BY LINE 51–66 (Aspatore Books 2004). 
 34 See id. at 63 (highlighting that most commercial software licenses limit 
recovery “to all or some portion of the fees paid for the software”). 
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unlikely to influence the cybersecurity of AASD design or operation 
beyond that minimally necessary for the seller to exist in the 
marketplace. 
In the third market segment, automotive, the contracting power 
resides almost exclusively with the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (“OEM”).35 Neither suppliers nor end-users hold 
much sway over the allocation of risks in the subject agreements. 
Purchasers of automotive vehicles take the vehicle subject to the 
OEM’s software license terms, or the pass-through licenses of the 
OEM’s supplier, with no opportunity to negotiate on matters other 
than the vehicle price. Suppliers wish to access the lucrative 
aftermarket for spare parts and additional services that stem from 
being included in the OEM’s vehicle offering.36 In exchange for this 
advantageous market position, suppliers typically offer little 
resistance to the OEM’s supplier agreements.37 These OEM 
agreements generally seek to avoid both the costs of undertaking 
cybersecurity measures and the liabilities for any resulting harms, 
although there is evidence that some information technology 
suppliers have been able to negotiate these terms.38 Nonetheless, 
                                                
 35 A company that produces a product from component parts supplied by others. 
For example, an automobile manufacturer or airplane manufacturer. 
 36 Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in 
Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 958, 981–982 (2006). While 
Ben-Shahar and White focused on Tier 1 suppliers, defined as “anyone who sells 
directly to an OEM,” to the auto industry, id. at 955, they noted that the OEM’s 
admit to using rigid boilerplate forms drafted in “a one-sided, self-serving 
manner.” Id. at 981. The authors additionally note that suppliers will often invest 
significant sums for tooling and production in hopes that they will be able to 
support continued production and supply of service parts for the lifecycle of the 
vehicle. See id. at 963; see also OEM Supplier Relations and Deregulation, JET-
TEK, https://jet-tek.com/aerospace-industry-direction/oem-supplier-relations-
deregulation/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018) (describing similar behaviors in the 
aerospace sector and noting that suppliers are willing to absorb significant 
investment costs to secure a position in the production supply chain and access to 
aftermarket revenue streams). 
 37 Ben-Shahar & White, supra note at 36, at 981–82 (noting suppliers are often 
“captives” of the OEMs). 
 38 Id. at 960–61, n.31 (noting that OEMs draft broad indemnity terms obligating 
suppliers to reimburse and defend the OEM against product liability claims). 
OCT. 2018]Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in Transport 137 
contracting terms are still likely to be very favorable to the OEM 
and provide few contract incentives for the OEM to undertake 
cybersecurity measures on their own.39 In those cases where an 
information technology provider has negotiated to provide a cap on 
liability or warranty claims, such terms limit the supplier’s financial 
risk. Reason suggests that such provisions may also dampen the 
supplier’s incentive to aggressively work cybersecurity issues 
generally as well as those specifically arising from the OEM’s use 
case. 
Additionally, in all transportation sectors, certain types of harm, 
including significant physical harms, may in fact be borne by third 
parties not a party to any AASD agreement. A seaman injured when 
his ship runs aground due to corrupted navigation data will not likely 
benefit from the damages and liability provisions contained within 
the shipping line’s AASD contract. AASD contracts allocate the 
risks of financial harms, including third party financial liability, 
between the contracting parties.40 Yet, the AASD agreement likely 
does nothing to allocate risks between third parties and the AASD 
suppliers or users, since those third parties do not exist as a party or 
intended beneficiary to the agreement. 
B. Insurance 
Parties providing and procuring AASD may wish to procure 
cover to ameliorate the losses suffered from cyber-threat events. 
Cover is most commonly obtained as an insurance product, but 
cover to protect against losses can also be attained via other financial 
instruments such as a bond, or maintenance of a cash reserve.41 
                                                
However, Ben-Shahar & White also note that IT suppliers can sometimes secure 
more favorable terms that limit warranties and cap remedies at repair and 
replacement. Id. at 978. 
 39 Id. at 960 (alleging that the OEM’s one-sided contract terms are economically 
inefficient because the OEM has little incentive to avoid or address product 
quality issues directly; and further noting that the OEMs with the most self-
serving contract language take the longest to identify and resolve a defect). 
 40 See, e.g., OVERLY & KALYVAS, supra note 33, at 51–66. 
 41 See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 540.24 (2018) (describing various types of financial 
vehicles available to operators of passenger vessels as proof of adequate financial 
responsibility for liabilities arising from death or injury to passengers). 
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When cover is procured via an insurance product, the underwriter 
would theoretically be incentivized to reward those behaviors that 
mitigate cyber-threats and reduce the probability of paying out a 
claim. Both aviation and maritime insurance contracts, however, 
specifically exclude cyber event coverage via standard pro-forma 
clauses.42 The absence of insurance as a readily available form of 
cover means fewer financial resources exist to pay out claims made 
by third parties who suffer damage as a consequence of cyber-
threats. 
In the automotive industry, insurance providers appear to have a 
more progressive outlook, and appear to be prepping for the arrival 
of autonomous cars.43 One study estimated that cybersecurity will be 
the greatest driver of premiums in the auto insurance segment, 
                                                
 42 KATHERINE B. POSNER, TIM MARLAND & PHILIP CHRYSTAL, MARGO ON 
AVIATION INSURANCE APPENDIX: AVIATION POLICY FORMS, CLAUSES AND 
ENDORSEMENTS STANDARD CLAUSE AVN 48 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2016) 
(specifically excluding from coverage claims caused by “any malicious act or act 
of sabotage,” however, none of the standard clauses or exclusions specifically 
mention cyber-attacks.); see also LLYOD’S MARKET ASSOCIATION, CYBER RISKS 
AND EXPOSURES: MODEL CLAUSES—CLASS OF BUSINESS REVIEW § 3 (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc =s&source=web&cd= 
1&ved=2ahUKEwiTlZHIr-HdAhXwITQIHXFzBCMQFjAAegQICRAC 
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lmalloyds.com%2FAsiCommon%2FControls%2F
BSA%2FDownloader.aspx%3FiDocumentStorageKey%3Dc3910476-c5d4-
47b1-bf3c-8b7e12e08299%26iFileTypeCode%3DPDF%26iFileName 
%3DCyber%2520Clauses%2520Review&usg=AOvVaw0lFlryOCXotAHBal-
JdROA (noting that many aviation policies are “silent” regarding the coverage of 
cybersecurity claims but include the standard exclusion for “ ‘malicous acts and 
sabotage’ (which potentially comprises cyber-attacks)” and for which additional 
coverage is available. The document additionally notes that clause CL380 is 
widely used in the marine industry to exclude cyber-attack coverage); see also 
Jonathon Saul & Carolyn Cohn, Insurance gaps leave shipping exposed to 
growing cyber threats, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2017, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shipping-insurance-cyber-
idUSKBN14W1EA (confirming the maritime industry general practice as 
reported in the Margo text). 
 43 See Werner Rapberger, Markets Offering the Largest Cyber Security 
Insurance Opportunity, ACCENTURE (Nov. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Rapberger, 
Markets], https://insuranceblog.accenture.com/markets-offering-the-largest-
cyber-security-insurance-opportunity. 
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projecting a total of $64 billion by 2025.44 These automobile policies 
anticipate underwriting coverage for ransomware, vehicle theft, 
unauthorized entry, and identity theft.45 Of note, a review of these 
policies as described in the available literature appear to address 
only the economic harms suffered by the driver, and do not 
underwrite bodily injury to the driver or others resulting from the 
compromise of automotive AASD. 
The availability and scope of policies to underwrite the 
cybersecurity risks faced by OEMs and automotive AASD suppliers 
also continues to evolve. As in the aviation and marine insurance 
markets, such risks are disclaimed by standard policy provisions and 
the ability to purchase riders expansive enough to cover risks 
beyond data breaches appears quite limited.46 Although some 
insurance products such as AIG’s CyberEdge offer a complete 
corporate insurance product, which includes protection against third 
party claims, the industry struggles to introduce new coverages.47 
Underwriters cite the following problems in assessing risk: a lack of 
data reporting actual events; and that the amount of data currently 
available is insufficient to support the actuarial processes.48 
Underwriters also live in fear that a single cyber hack or breach 
could result in a cascading and catastrophic accumulation of 
                                                
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Tony Chimino, 5 Types of Cyber Liabilities for Manufacturers, 18 
INDUSTRY TODAY, no. 3, 2015, at 30–37, https://industrytoday.com/article/5-
types-of-cyber-liabilities-for-manufacturers/ (noting that general liability policies 
now typically exclude cyber risks requiring the purchase of separate, additional 
policies); Jayleen R. Heft, 7 Challenges Insurers Face in the Cyber Insurance 
Market, PROPERTYCASUALTY360 (Mar. 8, 2017, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2017/03/08/7-challenges-insurers-face-
in-the-cyber-insurance/?slreturn=20180805001533 (noting that cyber insurance 
products are a “work in progress” and that existing products narrowly define the 
risks underwritten and ignore many of the cyber risks companies actually face). 
 47 See Werner Rapberger, The New Shape of Cyber Security Insurance – 
Meeting Evolving Threats Head On, ACCENTURE (Nov. 8, 2017) [hereinafter 
Rapberger, New Shape], https://insuranceblog.accenture.com/the-new-shape-of-
cyber-security-insurance-meeting-evolving-threats-head-on. 
 48 Id. 
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claims.49 Given these uncertainties, cover for cyber-related risks is 
usually comprised of non-standardized products that are not widely 
available—at least at the moment. Furthermore, even when 
available, studies note that only 50% of U.S. businesses obtain cyber 
risk insurance to cover either their business or their products.50 
Insurance therefore does not exist as a mechanism to promote 
AASD cybersecurity because widespread underwriting of these 
risks does not exist. Thus, the opportunity for insurers to exert 
influence over AASD providers through counseling and oversight 
of the insured is essentially nonexistent for the transportation sector. 
C. Product Liability Tort Law 
Beginning in the late 1800s, courts began holding manufacturers 
and others liable for distributing defective products that cause 
injury.51 The courts, and the later-enacted state product liability 
laws, enabled the pursuit of such claims under theories of 
negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty.52 Whether via 
common law or legislation, products liability law seeks the 
attainment of two public policy goals: (1) to compensate those 
injured by unsafe products; and (2) to provide incentives for 
manufacturers to take reasonable precautions in the design and 
manufacture of their products.53 The later purpose recognizes that 
manufacturers are often the parties with the best opportunity and 
lowest cost to minimize or avoid any downstream harms resulting 
from the intended use of their products.54 
Criticism of product liability law notes that such laws may not 
be necessary where consumers have both the information and the 
                                                
 49 Id. 
 50 Rapberger, Markets, supra note 43. 
 51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
1503, 1533–34 (2013), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/ 
nulr/vol107/iss4/1. 
 54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. e, § 2 cmt. a. 
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opportunity to select those products they deem safer than others.55 
Manufacturers of safer products are therefore rewarded in the 
marketplace with a greater number of sales. These supply and 
demand market forces combine such that consumers purchase, and 
manufacturers also provide safety benefits at an economically 
efficient level.56 
In the case of autonomous and automatic systems, however, the 
end users of such products may not be aware of the information 
needed to discriminate on this basis until after a potentially fatal 
accident has occurred. In addition, by design, the operation of 
autonomous and automatic systems is not transparent to even the 
most sophisticated of users. The consumers of such systems likely 
possess little practical information about how the system performs 
and may not even be aware of a cyber breach until well after the 
fact.57 These unique aspects of AASD leave the purchasers of such 
systems with little opportunity to avoid the harms of cyber 
malfeasance on their own, other than by installing patches supplied 
by the manufacturer.58 As a practical matter, end users may also 
possess little real marketplace choice if the entire industry 
underspends on preventing cybersecurity risks.59 Therefore, holding 
                                                
 55 See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for 
Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010), https://harvardlawreview.org/ 
2010/04/the-uneasy-case-for-product-liability/. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See, e.g., Steven Overly, What we know about car hacking, the CIA and those 
WikiLeaks claims, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/03/08/what-we-know-about-car-hacking-the-
cia-and-those-wikileaks-claims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.596922bec42a 
(quoting cybersecurity researcher Chris Valasek: “It doesn’t appear that any 
manufacturers currently have detection/prevention methods for such attacks,” and 
noting that experts such as University of Michigan researcher Sam Lauzon and 
cybersecurity expert Yoni Heilbron believe it can be difficult to know when a 
vehicle has been hacked); see also Steve Tengler, Top 10 Unspoken Automotive 
Cybersecurity Risks, WARDSAUTO (Jul. 17, 2018), https://www.wardsauto.com/ 
industry-voices/top-10-unspoken-automotive-cybersecurity-risks. 
 58 Tengler, supra note 57. 
 59 See id. (noting the business and financial challenges in providing automotive 
cybersecurity to consumers). See also Dourado & Brito, supra note 29, for a 
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manufacturers of AASD accountable for the harms resulting from 
insecure devices aligns with the public policy purpose of products 
liability law by encouraging investment in security measures by the 
party that can better assess the risk and more efficiently bear the 
burden. 
Yet, most commentators remain skeptical that product liability 
principles can be successfully applied to insecure software and 
equipment.60 The relative inability of private parties to allocate the 
risks of cybersecurity via contract and warranty claims has been 
noted previously above. Breach of warranty due to defective cyber-
secure design is likely to have been explicitly disclaimed.61 
Imposing products liability for defective software, data, and 
equipment via concepts of negligence or strict liability also remains 
problematic.62 The core inquiry in such cases centers on whether the 
harm resulted from a product defect caused by either: a deficiency 
in the product’s design, its manufacture, or in warnings about its 
inappropriate use.63 Software code prone to hacking has typically 
been viewed as suffering from a design defect.64 Furthermore, the 
possibility exists that firmware or chips containing malware 
supplied via a manufacturer’s supply chain, or certain unanticipated 
instabilities in code operation might be considered a manufacturing 
defect to which strict liability attaches. Whatever the origin of the 
alleged defect, applying the current legal tests used to establish 
negligence in the design, or deficiencies in manufacture, pose 
significant difficulties in the context of software and cybersecurity.65 
                                                
general discussion of how market failures can contribute to underspending on 
cybersecurity. 
 60 See generally Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) 
Things: Should Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked 
Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 913 (2017), https://repository.law.umich.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=mjlr. 
 61 OVERLY & KALYVAS, supra note 33, at 52. 
 62 Butler, supra note 60, at 915–16. 
 63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 64 Butler, supra note 60, at 917. 
 65 Id. 
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Two tests exist for establishing the existence of a design defect. 
The first adopts a risk vs. utility test to determine if the foreseeable 
harms could be avoided via adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design. This test rapidly devolves into a highly technical argument 
about whether the hack or resulting harm could have reasonably 
been avoided if the code were reasonably rewritten in an alternative 
manner.66 The second, a consumer expectations test, examines 
whether the product performs safely when used as intended.67 This 
second test, while more closely aligned with concepts of strict 
liability, can pose difficulties in application when the product is 
truly complex or poses obvious risks of use.68 
A third source of products liability, the duty to warn, exists in 
the jurisprudence of more than half the states and in the Third 
Restatement of Torts.69 This legal test also balances the risks vs. the 
burden of providing the warning. Courts are more likely to impose 
this duty when an ongoing relationship exists with the customer 
post-sale.70 In the context of AASD, such warnings might include 
providing security patches, the supply of which serves to notify the 
user of a cyber vulnerability. 
Optionally, the duty to warn could conceivably include a blanket 
warning that harm may result by not maintaining a vigilant watch 
over the performance of the system even though automated. This 
latter type of warning may be most effective in those transportation 
applications where professional licensed personnel such as pilots 
and ships’ masters remain ultimately responsible for the overall 
vehicle operation. This type of warning may be ineffective or 
unjustified in driverless cars where one benefit of the product is to 
enable transportation for elderly or otherwise impaired drivers. 
The duty to warn, even where it exists, may also give rise to 
counterproductive outcomes. For example, actually providing a 
security patch or a warning to operators about potential 
consequences of hacked systems, may perversely serve as a means 
                                                
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 918. 
 70 Id. 
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for manufacturers to avoid liability for design defects that might 
have been avoided in the first place. Ultimately, the harm caused by 
cyber breaches results from the bad acts of a third party. But, no one 
today can claim that such acts are not foreseeable. And, 
manufacturers remain the parties best able to take actions that 
protect against these harms—exactly the type of behavior that 
products liability law is designed to incentivize. 
Yet, even if liability can be established under the existing 
theories of product liability outlined above, there remains the issue 
of quantifying and proving harm. As a general rule under the 
Restatement of Torts and as adopted by several states, manufacturers 
are not liable for the economic harm suffered from use of the 
defective product.71 This limitation on recovery “has long been 
viewed as an impediment to products liability” for defective 
software and systems.72 In the transportation sector, such economic 
harms might include, for example, improper navigation 
performance that routes an aircraft or vehicle in such a manner that 
it consumes additional fuel or causes a rippling effect of 
transportation system delays; or an automobile rendered useless by 
ransomware. Application of the economic loss doctrine would not 
permit recovery of such pecuniary losses under the Restatement of 
Torts, even if such harms resulted from an insecure, defectively 
designed AASD. 
Other types of losses, may however, be recoverable. In the 
transportation sector, many foreseeable harms are not economic and 
unfortunately include physical harm to tangible assets, such as an 
automobile, a ship, or an aircraft; as well as bodily or emotional 
harm to their occupants. Moreover, these same types of harm could 
potentially be inflicted upon innocent bystanders. At present, the 
law is unclear on whether these types of damages resulting from 
cyber breaches of a defective product can be recovered, although 
proposed changes to the Restatement favors recovery for damage to 
tangible property or physical injury arising from insecure devices.73 
                                                
 71 Id. at 919. 
 72 Id. at 920. 
 73 Id. at 921. 
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Product liability law as an incentive for hygienic cyber-security 
behaviors thus holds much promise, but the state of its development 
is immature. Not all types of harms suffered, even though potentially 
significant, can be recovered. Additional limitations on the 
effectiveness of product liability law arise not only from the 
difficulty of proving defective design in this context, but in the 
ability of manufacturers to use warnings and subsequent software 
patches to avoid liability. This latter outcome may perversely result 
in underinvestment in the initial cybersecurity design. 
IV.   PUBLIC LAW: CYBERSECURITY REGULATION OF 
AASD 
Given the difficulties faced by private law in encouraging and 
achieving a desired level of cybersecurity behaviors, a reasonable 
alternative lies in the promulgation of regulations via the public 
sector. But, this approach also remains fraught with difficulties. 
Cybersecurity regulation within the transportation sector exists as a 
multitude of separate regulatory approaches by specialist executive 
branch agencies with no overarching coherent federal approach, and 
only limited inter-agency coordination.74 
The sections below contain a detailed review of the current 
transportation sector-specific regulations and those that bear upon 
its cybersecurity. Regulations contain the detailed implementation 
of the broader statutory authority from which they derive and define 
the particular actions AASD providers, manufacturers, and users 
must undertake. And, as noted previously above, agencies 
sometimes refrain from promulgating cybersecurity regulations 
even when they are statutorily enabled to do so. A survey of relevant 
agency regulations therefore enables a comparison of the various 
regulatory frameworks and identifies opportunities for reform. 
More specifically, the sections below contain a detailed review 
of the regulations promulgated by the following federal agencies. 
The FCC Rules control the provision and use of the satellite 
telecommunications systems and terrestrial wireless networks that 
                                                
 74 FISHER, supra note 5. 
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form the communications backbone of a connected AASD.75 The 
U.S. Coast Guard promulgates rules pertaining to maritime 
operations.76 The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 
promulgates rules pertaining to aircraft operations, and the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Administration promulgates rules 
pertaining to manufacture and sale of autonomous surface 
vehicles.77 Potential utilization of remote sensing data by AASD 
make the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) regulatory framework also of interest.78 
A.  Rules Applicable to All Connected AASD: FCC Regulations 
The FCC regulations relevant to AASD address the 
telecommunications components of the AASD communications 
segment. As shown in Figure 2 above, many AASD connect to a 
communications backbone for purposes of receiving and 
transmitting data and control information. In most applications, the 
communications segment connects to the internet or a dedicated 
communications circuit via cellular wireless communications. 
Increasingly, AASD communications segments include mobile 
satellite services (“MSS”), especially in remote areas or over the 
high seas. All MSS and wireless service providers must comply with 
the licensing, technical, and operating regulations promulgated by 
the FCC, regardless of the specific type or use of the mobile service. 
The FCC regulations also implement and mandate compliance with 
                                                
 75 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (describing the authority of the FCC to regulate 
radio services generally). 
 76 14 U.S.C. § 2(3) (2018). 
 77 49 U.S.C. §§ 106, 40101 (2018) (establishing the FAA and defining its policy 
objectives respectively); 14 C.F.R. ch. I (containing the aviation safety 
regulations); 49 U.S.C. §§ 105, 30101 et seq. (providing the basis and framework 
for the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration enforcement 
authority over motor vehicles). 
 78 For example, satellite remote sensing data of fields and crops, coupled with 
GPS data, can enable a farmer’s equipment to precisely modulate the amount of 
fertilizer and water applied to locations within a field. See, e.g., P. C. Scharf, et 
al., Remote Sensing for Nitrogen Management, 57 J. SOIL & WATER 
CONSERVATION 518 (2002), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5513/ 
8b91a9fe6bf475541e374500d218cfe4724f.pdf. 
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the ITU Radio Regulations and the radio provisions of all 
international treaties to which the United States is a party.79 Thus, to 
the extent FCC regulations and the ITU Radio Regulations mandate 
cybersecurity protections, any requirements will be applicable to all 
operators of AASD regardless of type. 
1. FCC Regulation of MSS 
The International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), 
classifies mobile satellite services (“MSS”) into five separate 
subcategories of service: maritime mobile satellite service 
(“MMSS”); land mobile satellite service (“LMSS”); aeronautical 
mobile satellite service (“AMSS”); personal mobile satellite service 
(PMSS); and broadcast mobile satellite service (“BCMSS”).80 Of 
these broad categories, MMSS, LMSS, and AMSS are the most 
relevant to implementation of AASD in the transportation sector. 
The licensing provisions of 47 CFR Part 25 address the initial 
licensing of MSS systems and apply separate criteria to the licensing 
of space stations and earth stations.81 Appendices A-1 and A-2 
contain tables summarizing the specific FCC licensing regulations 
applicable to MSS. These regulations primarily operate to ensure 
that equipment will transmit within the assigned frequency band 
without harming others’ use of the radio spectrum. Additional 
regulations address system ownership and restrict communications 
with non-U.S. satellites.82 While the regulations reduce 
cybersecurity threats by constraining the number of interfaces with 
non-U.S. persons and systems, the purpose of these regulations is 
not cybersecurity, but the oversight of market competition and 
compliance with U.S. treaty commitments. 
                                                
 79 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 80.86. 
 80 Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Radio Reg. art. 1.19–1.60, Section III – Radio 
Services, in Volume 1 Radio Regulations: Articles, Chapter 1: Terminology and 
Technical Characteristics, at 9–13 (2016). 
 81 47 C.F.R. § 25. 
 82 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 25.135, .137, .143, .149 (restricting communications with 
non-U.S. satellite systems); 47 C.F.R. § 20.5 (documenting citizenship 
requirements). 
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Other operational requirements applicable to all types of satellite 
communications can be found in Subpart D of 47 CFR Part 25. 
Certain of these general operating provisions are relevant to 
cybersecurity best practices. For example, 47 CFR § 25.271 requires 
operators of transmitting stations to stand watch at all times 
whenever the station is transmitting.83 Transmitting facilities must 
be protected against both unauthorized access and unauthorized 
operations whenever an operator is not present at the station.84 
Within the 1.5/1.6 GHz frequency bands, mobile earth stations must 
include features that ensure the station accesses the communications 
network subject to the frequency use priority rights of others.85 
Mobile earth stations operating within these bands must also 
transmit a unique terminal identification code upon any attempt to 
access the network and must be configured to immediately inhibit 
its transmissions upon receiving a channel shut off command or 
upon loss of channel assignment and control information.86 These 
requirements, while intended to preserve the frequency sharing 
schemes between primary and secondary uses of the spectrum, do 
afford some measure of protection should hackers attempt to initiate 
unauthorized use of MSS earth stations because these requirements 
either thwart unauthorized access or make unauthorized access 
detectable. 
Later chapters of the FCC regulations apply more specific Rules 
to operation of MMSS, VMSS, and AMSS.87 The FCC requires 
operators of all ship earth stations, and all aircraft earth stations to 
be licensed and to display such license.88 Operator licenses are not 
required for automobile receive-only earth stations. Although 
certain licenses are granted automatically by rule, foreign 
                                                
 83 47 C.F.R. § 25.271. 
 84 47 C.F.R. § 25.271(d). 
 85 47 C.F.R. § 25.287. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See 47 C.F.R. pts. 80, 87, 90, for maritime, for aviation, and private land 
mobile services respectively. 
 88 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 80.51, .13, for ships and 47 C.F.R. §§ 87.19, .103, for 
aircraft. 
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governments and their representatives cannot obtain earth station 
licenses.89 
Ships subject to the Communications Act or the Safety 
Convention are also subject to annual inspection of their shipboard 
communications equipment.90 Additional operating rules define 
communications protocols to ensure that a single station does not 
unduly monopolize the operating frequency.91 In the aviation 
environment, the FCC places additional physical controls upon 
operations of the transmitter. Specifically, 47 CFR § 87.143 states 
that transmitters must be installed such that only authorized users 
have access and airborne transmitters must be able to be switched 
off by the operator.92 
2. FCC Regulation of Mobile Radio Services 
A review of the FCC’s wireless network ownership and operator 
regulations reveals approaches and issues similar to those outlined 
above in connection with MSS. As in the case of MSS, the FCC 
requires a license to operate the service.93 Ownership of the wireless 
network is only available to U.S. citizens and corporations 
controlled by U.S. entities.94 Carriers having more than sixteen 
employees must also file an annual employment report, but this 
report merely documents the demographics and diversity of the 
carriers’ personnel.95 The required employment report does not 
reach matters of interest to cybersecurity such as vetting or 
credentialing of those employees.96 
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Additional Rules govern the technical performance of the 
wireless network and its equipment. Wireless network terminals, 
including end-user and intermediate communications nodes and 
equipment, must satisfy technical requirements that prevent harm to 
the public switched telephone network, and interference with others’ 
lawful use of spectrum.97 The FCC additionally requires certification 
that the wireless communications equipment complies with these 
technical conditions.98 The cell towers and their radio equipment 
which form component parts of the wireless network are also 
regulated by the FCC.99 Cellular radio facilities (i.e. radio 
stations/towers) must be registered with the FCC and comply with 
rigid technical specifications.100 Via these Rules, much like in MSS, 
the FCC specifies the technical performance of the radio equipment 
and antennae to ensure lawful use of the spectrum and that 
transmissions do not interfere with others’ lawful use of the 
airwaves. Much of the FCC’s remaining rule-making regarding 
mobile services centers on tariffs, roaming, and spectrum 
allocation.101 
3. Other FCC Cybersecurity Policy and Guidance 
The FCC maintains a Public Safety and Homeland Security 
Bureau that encourages MSS and wireless service providers to 
implement the security countermeasures developed by the agency’s 
Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability 
Council.102 This Council, composed of industry participants, 
endeavors “to make recommendations to the [FCC] that promote the 
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security, reliability, and resiliency of the Nation’s communications 
systems.”103 The Council currently convenes three Working Groups, 
each Group focused on making recommendations regarding a single 
narrow sub-topic related to the Council’s larger mission statement. 
Working Group 3, “Network Reliability and Security Risk 
Reduction,” is the only current Working Group with a mandate 
specifically encompassing communications network cyber-security 
issues.104 More specifically, the Working Group 3 identifies and 
examines security risks to: wireless protocols, the design and 
implementation of 5G networks, and IoT devices.105 While from 
time to time, the Council, via this Working Group provides reports 
to the FCC , for reasons discussed further below, the FCC merely 
issues guidance that encourages, but does not require compliance 
with the Group’s recommendations. Recently, for example, the FCC 
issued a Public Notice encouraging communications service 
providers to implement a recommended best practice to counter a 
known exploitation of the carrier system signaling protocols used by 
the network infrastructure.106 Since these best practices are just 
suggestions by the FCC, compliance is entirely voluntary and not 
enforced. 
4. Summary and Analysis of FCC Cybersecurity Regulations 
This review of the FCC Rules governing the MSS and cellular 
networks that form the AASD communication backbone reveals that 
the existing FCC Rules do not address cybersecurity directly. 
Rather, the Rules primarily function to ensure that an operator’s 
legitimate use of their own systems does not interfere with or 
compromise the use of another’s communication system. As such, a 
significant percentage of the Rules focus primarily on technical 
configurations, antenna specifications, design tolerances, and 
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operator protocols. Certain of the Rules, such as physical access 
requirements and preventing open mikes, may have ancillary 
positive impacts on cyber security although that outcome is not their 
primary purpose. 
Although the FCC Rules do not currently address cybersecurity 
directly, under the previous administration, the FCC asserted that it 
had the statutory authority to make these types of Rules if it desired 
to do so.107 As of this writing, however, the FCC only exerts 
oversight of cybersecurity behaviors during its review of potential 
telecommunications merger partners.108 The agency explained its 
lack of rulemaking in this area in its January 2017 position paper by 
noting that additional study is needed before the Agency 
promulgates cybersecurity regulations.109 
In point of fact, legitimate questions exist about the FCC’s 
previous claim that its statutory authority extends to oversight of 
cybersecurity for cellular and satellite networks. More specifically, 
FCC Commissioner Michael O’Rielly recently wrote that he 
believes the FCC’s cyber authority to be “extremely limited.”110 
O’Rielly criticized previous Chairman Wheeler and others for the 
elastic interpretation of the FCC’s enabling statute advanced in the 
2017 position paper: an interpretation that would justify 
cybersecurity oversight of the communications infrastructure by the 
FCC.111 Current FCC Commissioners do not agree on the agency’s 
ability or inability to regulate cybersecurity matters. In recent 
testimony before Congress, FCC Chair Pai stated the agency lacked 
the authority to lead on cybersecurity.112 But later in the same 
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hearing, FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel disagreed stating 
that the agency had an existing duty as public servants to engage in 
cybersecurity oversight and additional legislation was not needed.113 
As a consequence of this ambiguity, Democrats in Congress want 
new legislation to not only grant the FCC the necessary statutory 
authority, but to explicitly instruct the agency to proactively issue 
cybersecurity regulations for the communications networks it 
oversees.114 
In 2017, Representative Yvette Clark (D) of New York 
introduced HR 1335, the Cybersecurity Responsibility Act of 2017. 
The draft legislation directs the FCC to issue new rules to secure 
communications networks from cyber risks.115 As of this writing, 
September 2018 the bill has been introduced in the House and 
referred to the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology 
with no further action taken.116 Thus, the creation of additional 
cybersecurity requirements for MSS and cellular networks remains 
unlikely given both the current administration and the existing 
statutory ambiguity. 
Nonetheless, the FCC continues to proactively work with 
industry groups to better understand market conditions, legal and 
technical constraints, and cybersecurity best practices via the 
Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council. 
In 2015, the Council’s Working Group 4 collaborated with multiple 
telecommunications industry segments to promote voluntary 
compliance with the NIST cybersecurity risk framework.117 
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Working Group 4 also documented that telecommunications 
providers found sharing of event and threat information to be a best 
practice for cyber risk mitigation.118 Working Group 5 was therefore 
subsequently tasked with developing recommendations to 
encourage sharing of cybersecurity information amongst 
telecommunications industry participants.119 Although Working 
Group 5 identified several mechanisms currently utilized by 
industry participants to share cyber threat information, several 
barriers to actually sharing that information exist.120 Specifically, 
companies expressed a reticence to share attack information with 
regulators and each other for fear of liability, the imposition of 
future regulation, or subsequent disclosure by competitors.121 
Precedent for enabling companies to confidentially report cyber-
related incidents with liability protection exists. The Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) encourages private citizens and 
entities to voluntarily report significant cybersecurity events and to 
seek assistance in responding to those events.122 Per Presidential 
Policy Directive PPD-41, to the extent allowed under federal law, 
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the Department endeavors to keep such information confidential and 
not disclose it to others.123 Working Group 5 thus recognized that 
DHS plays the lead role in coordinating the dissemination of cyber 
threat information and recommended that the FCC refrain from 
duplicating these efforts.124 
Yet, the DHS cyber event reporting regime as currently executed 
does not fully address the barriers to information sharing identified 
by Working Group 5. The process implemented by the Presidential 
Directive is distinct from and does not contain many of the statutory 
protections found within the cyber event disclosure provisions of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Section 214 of that Act provides a 
mechanism for voluntarily disclosing cyber event information to 
DHS, when such an event impacts “critical infrastructure and 
protected systems.”125 Disclosures made under this statutory 
provision prohibit disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 
prevent the use of that information in regulatory enforcement, and 
bar the information from use in any civil lawsuit.126 Since only 
disclosures pertaining to critical infrastructure are covered under 
this statute, not every voluntary disclosure of cyber events receives 
the benefit of these statutory protections. MSS and cellular systems 
do not typically fall within the critical infrastructure definition. 
Hence, information voluntarily reported to the FCC or DHS about 
cyber incidents involving those systems often do not enjoy the 
protections of the Homeland Security Act, and must rely on the 
much more limited protections afforded under PPD-41. 
The proposed Cybersecurity Responsibility Act of 2017, HR 
1335, would elevate communications networks generally, including 
all types of satellite mobile communications networks, to “critical 
infrastructure and protected systems” as that term is defined in 
sections 2(4) and 212(6) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.127 
Adoption of this measure resolves the reporting dilemmas raised by 
mobile communications companies and their suppliers. Since the 
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bill also includes provisions that would expand the FCC’s regulatory 
authority, the bill is unlikely to pass. 
B.  Cybersecurity Regulation of AASD in the Maritime 
Transportation Sector 
On the high seas, ships employing AASD must utilize over-the-
horizon communications services such as MSS as their AASD 
communications backbone. Mobile satellite services for shipborne 
uses have the longest history of operational deployment of all MSS 
applications. These services thus also comprise the largest share of 
the total MSS market.128 Most notable among maritime MSS service 
providers is the industry’s first, Inmarsat.129 Created in 1979 as a 
non-profit intergovernmental organization, Inmarsat’s original 
mandate was to establish and operate a satellite communications 
network for ocean vessels.130 Initially, the organization offered only 
satellite radio-telephony services for safety of life at sea, but the 
organization—since privatized—now offers many additional 
services ranging from media entertainment and broadband internet 
to ship security status and position tracking.131 The growing demand 
for these maritime broadband products encouraged competitors to 
offer their own similar suite of satellite services.132 Other mobile 
satellite applications widely available in the marine sector include: 
global satellite navigation, weather imagery, emergency locator 
beacons, logistics and cargo management, internet connectivity, and 
                                                
 128 See BRYCE SPACE & TECH., SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 2017 
STATE OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY REPORT (2017); Mobile Satellite Services 
Market Size and Forecast, HEXA RESEARCH, https://www.hexaresearch.com/ 
research-report/mobile-satellite-services-market; Peter B. de Selding, Comsys 
Survey Sees No Letup in Maritime Market Growth, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 25, 2015), 
https://spacenews.com/comsys-survey-sees-no-letup-in-maritime-market-
growth/; Mobile Satellite Services Market worth $5.62 Billion by 2019, 
MARKETSANDMARKETS, https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/ 
mobile-satellite-services.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 129 About Us, INMARSAT, https://www.inmarsat.com/about-us/ (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2018). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Maritime, INMARSAT, https://www.inmarsat.com/maritime/ (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2018). 
 132 See de Selding, supra note 128. 
OCT. 2018]Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in Transport 157 
satellite-based implementations of the Automatic Identification 
System (“AIS”). 
The AIS is an automatic tracking system used to broadcast ship 
position information to other ships and to vessel traffic management 
services. The AIS service thus plays a critical role in separating 
marine traffic and avoiding collisions. U.S. regulations 
implementing the International Maritime Organization Safety of 
Life at Sea (“SOLAS”) requirements mandate AIS aboard all 
passenger ships carrying more than 150 passengers, commercial 
ships greater than 65 feet in length, certain commercial tugs and 
fishing vessels, and vessels carrying dangerous cargo.133 
Near shore, the AIS utilizes VHF134 line of sight radio 
transmissions received directly by the vessel traffic management 
ground stations as well as by the nearby ships.135 On the open ocean, 
AIS line of sight VHF signals can no longer be received directly by 
shore stations, but newer technologies enable companies such as 
ORBCOMM,136 exactEarth,137 Spire,138 and Spacequest139 to offer 
satellite-AIS services. Pending SOLAS mandates for long range 
tracking, and their corresponding U.S. regulatory requirements 
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ensure that these systems will become a universal safety and traffic 
separation tool and an integral component of maritime AASD.140 
A modern ship therefore includes numerous earth stations 
connecting to multiple mobile satellite services. Some of these earth 
stations provide critical safety functionality such as emergency 
notifications and tracking. Others deliver satellite navigation and 
weather data as an alternative source of information for ship 
operations. Mobile satellite services also provide non-critical 
communications and entertainment capability. The maritime sector 
has integrated MSS into routine operations more than any other 
sector, and thus has a larger cyber threat footprint. 
The United States Coast Guard has responsibility for protecting 
the nation’s maritime interests, port security, and licensing of 
vessels and ships’ personnel. The Coast Guard formally recognized 
the risks that cybersecurity challenges present to these missions in 
2015 when it officially released its “Cyber Strategy” policy.141 As 
articulated in the agency’s 2017 budget, by implementing this 
strategy, the Coast Guard seeks to “coordinate cyber regulatory and 
technical assistance activities across Federal, state and local 
maritime industry stakeholders.”142 According to Lieutenant 
Commander H. Lars McCarter, director of the Coast Guard Cyber 
Operations Center, “[b]ecause the Coast Guard’s missions include 
counterterrorism, anti-piracy, national security, and law 
enforcement against criminal organizations, it and its stakeholders 
potentially face greater danger of cyber-attack than other potential 
U.S. targets.”143 Commander Nick Wong, charged with 
implementing the industry portion of the cyber strategy, further 
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explains that the Coast Guard must address cyber threats originating 
from equipment failure and operator errors as well as from nefarious 
actors.144 For these reasons, he prefers the term, “cyber risk 
management,” to describe the Coast Guard’s approach to maritime 
industry cyber threats.145 
According to Commander Wong, one key goal in the risk 
management endeavor is clarifying what cyber threat activity the 
maritime industry must report.146 Maritime operators already face 
mandatory reporting requirements for marine casualties and 
pollution and safety issues, and it is clear the Coast Guard wishes to 
interpret its rule-making authority to encompass reporting of cyber 
threats.147 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
directed the Coast Guard and the maritime industry to develop 
security plans for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure.148 
Coast Guard regulations implementing this legislation now require 
mobile offshore drilling units, cargo vessels greater than 100 gross 
tons, tankers, and certain passenger vessels to keep records of and 
report security breaches and incidents to the Department of 
Homeland Security.149 
In December of 2016, the Coast Guard issued policy guidance 
specifically placing certain cybersecurity events within the scope of 
security incidents that must be reported.150 The policy guidance 
further directed that such incidents be reported to the Department of 
Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center, thereby awarding operators the liability and 
confidentiality protections previously identified above.151 
Paragraphs 3(A)(ii), (iii), and 3(B)(vi) of the policy guidance details 
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the metes and bounds of the cybersecurity events that do and do not 
merit reporting as follows: 
A. . . . . 
ii . . . . 
d) Intrusion into telecommunications equipment, computer, and 
networked systems linked to security plan functions (e.g., access control, 
cargo control, monitoring), unauthorized root or administrator access to 
security and industrial control systems, successful phishing attempts or 
malicious insider activity that could allow outside entities access to 
internal IT systems that are linked to the MTS; 
e) Instances of viruses, Trojan Horses, worms, zombies or other 
malicious software that have a widespread impact or adversely affect one 
or more on-site mission critical servers that are linked to security plan 
functions; and/or 
f) Any denial of service attacks that adversely affect or degrade access 
to critical services that are linked to security plan functions. 
iii. Note that routine spam, phishing attempts, and other nuisance events 
that do not breach a system’s defenses are NOT BoS. Furthermore, 
breaches of telecommunications equipment, computer, and networked 
systems that clearly target business or administrative systems unrelated 
to safe and secure maritime operations are outside the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s jurisdiction . . . . 
B. . . . . 
vi. The Coast Guard recognizes that the cyber domain includes countless 
malicious but low-level events that are normally addressed via standard 
anti-virus programs and similar protocols. Operators should only report 
events that are out of the ordinary in terms of sophistication, volume, or 
other factors which, from the operator’s perspective, raise suspicions.152 
Those same vessels subject to the aforementioned event 
reporting requirements are required by regulation to conduct Vessel 
Security Assessments153 and develop Vessel Security Plans.154 A 
Vessel Security Assessment (VSA) is “an analysis that examines 
and evaluates the vessel and its operations taking into account 
possible threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and existing 
protective measures, procedures and operations.”155 Rule 104.300 
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(d) (11) specifically states that preparation of the assessment should 
draw upon expertise in evaluating “[r]adio and telecommunications 
systems, including computer systems and networks . . . .”156 The 
existing regulation thus implicitly directs evaluation of 
cybersecurity threats. 
Additional security requirements specified by the rule contribute 
to the mitigation of cyber threats. Specifically, the regulations 
contain numerous provisions mandating personnel credentialing, 
security training, and physical access controls to sensitive 
locations.157 In addition, vessel operators must appoint a Chief 
Security Officer, whose duties include completion of Vessel 
Security Assessments and Plans, as well as periodic audits.158 One 
maritime industry security expert estimates that these security 
requirements will impact 10,300 U.S. Flag and SOLAS vessels and 
about 70 foreign flagged and non-SOLAS vessels at a total cost of 
$1.368B.159 
The Coast Guard regulatory approach to cybersecurity focuses 
not on equipment specifications, technical performance, or earth 
station design. Rather, the holistic approach mirrors the risk 
management approach of the NIST framework. The reach of the 
regulations extends, however, only to the vessels and specific 
surface operations under the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction, and hence 
only to those operations over which the vessel owner/operator has 
direct control. These regulations do not address potential risk 
vectors arising from the integrity of the space segment, or from third 
party suppression or corruption of valid message traffic. 
C.  Cybersecurity Regulation of AASD in the Aviation Sector 
Similar to the maritime industry, all aviation regulation exists 
within an overarching framework of international treaties and 
understandings administered by an IGO, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The FAA has primary responsibility 
                                                
 156 33 C.F.R. § 104.300(d)(11). 
 157 33 C.F.R. §§ 104.200, .225, .265. 
 158 33 C.F.R. §§ 104.210, .215, .415. 
 159 JONATHON K. WALDRON & ANDREW W. DYER, JR., MARITIME SECURITY 
HANDBOOK: IMPLEMENTING THE NEW U.S. INITIATIVES AND REGULATIONS 50 
(2005). 
162 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 121 
for promulgating regulations that implement U.S. aviation treaty 
obligations and ICAO agreements, and for exercising domestic 
oversight of aviation activities. In contrast to the maritime domain, 
which relies heavily on automation but has yet to experience 
significant use of autonomous craft, existing FAA regulations 
specifically address both manned and unmanned aircrafts. 
1. FAA Regulation of Manned Aircraft Systems and Operations 
Use of AASD in the aviation sector includes both discrete 
systems and connected AASD. Like their maritime counterparts, 
aircrafts flying over the high seas and in remote areas must use MSS. 
AMSS services include: satellite communications with air traffic 
control, private communications channels with airline operations, 
internet and cellular services for passengers, data uplink and 
downlink of passenger/customer service information and billing, 
inflight entertainment data, data links for navigation and weather 
information, and inflight uplink of aircraft telemetry to enhance 
aircraft reliability. In the wake of the mysterious loss of Malaysian 
Airlines Flight 370, aircraft on oceanic routes must include a means 
of continuously broadcasting their position via AMSS/ADS-B out 
by 2021.160 Over the landmass of the United States, connected 
AASD can utilize cellular networks using repurposed bandwidth 
originally set aside for mobile aeronautical communications. 
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Figure 3 diagrams typical data and telecommunications systems 
and networks aboard a modern large aircraft per the DOT Volpe 
Transportation Center.161 The ADN, or Aircraft Data Network, 
denotes an industry consensus standard specification for aircraft 
data network design promulgated by the Airlines Electronics 
Engineering Committee, for example, ARINC 664. Although most 
aircrafts place flight critical and non-flight critical services on 
separate data networks, as Figure 3 shows, the DOT believes that 
significant cyber security issues remain because of the potential for 
interconnectivity of aircraft communications links. 
The FAA regulatory approach differs fundamentally from that 
taken by its sister transportation agencies. FAA regulations may be 
broadly classed into the following types: those pertaining to 
operations, those pertaining to certification of personnel, those 
pertaining to airport facility design and security, and those 
                                                
 161 See MICHAEL G. DINNING, DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTRODUCTION TO 
CYBERSECURITY ISSUES FOR TRANSPORTATION 19 (2011), 
https://www.ahcusa.org/uploads/2/1/9/8/21985670/s111207_dinning_overviewo
f_transportation_cyber_issues.pdf, for the image Figure 3 is based upon. 
Figure 2: Aircraft Communications Networks and Services 
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pertaining to the certification of aircraft and aircraft software and 
equipment. The FAA does not appear to have adopted the holistic 
cybersecurity approach articulated by the Coast Guard in the 
maritime domain. This statement does not mean the FAA is 
insensitive to cybersecurity issues or that its regulatory structure 
lacks similar elements. When compared to the maritime domain, 
however, the aviation industry evolved in a way that places a greater 
emphasis on the certification of the aircraft and component 
subsystems. 
The FAA grants various certifications that enable personnel, 
equipment, and services to be introduced into the aviation 
ecosystem. More specifically, the FAA issues: 
(a) Licenses for pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and dispatchers; as 
well as credentialing of certain key airport and other aviation 
personnel,162 
(b) Production certificates and parts manufacturing authority for 
airframe producers and spare and component parts manufacturers,163 
(c) Airworthiness certificates for aircraft,164 
(d) Operator certificates for airlines and certain other operations,165 
(e) Certification of airports and navigation equipment,166 and 
(f) Supplemental Type Certificates and Technical Standard Orders 
which enable modification of an aircraft from its original configuration 
by adding or removing equipment.167 
Several of the certification regulations specify precise 
requirements or technical rules for issuance and compliance. For 
example, twin engine aircraft certification rules require flight tests 
that demonstrate the aircraft can take off on one engine and clear an 
obstacle of a specified height.168 In many cases, however, the FAA 
specifies certification requirements using industry consensus 
                                                
 162 14 C.F.R. pts. 60–68 (2018) (containing the licensing requirements for all 
Airmen). 
 163 14 C.F.R. pt. 21. 
 164 14 C.F.R. pts. 23, 25–27, 29, 31, 33, 35–36, 39. 
 165 14 C.F.R. pts. 110, 119, 125, 137. 
 166 14 C.F.R. pts. 150, 153, 157, 161, 170–71. 
 167 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.91–.101, .111–.120, .601–.621. 
 168 14 C.F.R. § 23.2120. 
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standards such as ARINC and RTCA.169 In addition, industry 
consensus standards bodies such as the Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE), the International Airline Transport Association 
(IATA), and Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) play a significant 
role in defining the design parameters and safety guidelines 
underpinning the certification process. Although the FAA 
incorporates and works cooperatively with consensus standards 
bodies, the agency retains via testing and review a measure of 
oversight to the acceptability and ultimate adoption of the resulting 
standards. 
Fundamentally, an aircraft does not go into service, nor a part 
installed thereon, without technical review by the FAA via the 
certification process. Of particular importance are the FAA’s 
software design guidelines as documented in Advisory Circular AC 
20-115D.170 This Advisory Circular cites an industry standard 
published by the RTCA as DO-178C, and recognizes that standard 
as an acceptable means, but not the only means, for establishing the 
airworthiness (certification requirements) of AASD software. The 
FAA classifies software according to the criticality of the function 
it performs.171 Class A software includes flight control systems, the 
failure of which results in catastrophic harm including possible 
fatalities.172 Class D and E software includes non-flight safety 
critical applications such as customer convenience internet 
connections that, if compromised, have little or no safety effect.173 
For each class of software, the Advisory Circular specifies a set of 
                                                
 169 See, e.g., YANN-HANG LEE, ET AL., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF 
TRANSP., DOT/FAA/AR-05/52, SAFETY AND CERTIFICATION APPROACHES FOR 
ETHERNET-BASED AVIATION DATABUSES (2005), https://www.faa.gov/ 
aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/air_software/media/05-52_Ethernet.pdf 
(noting several ARINC consensus standards). 
 170 SUSAN J. M. CABLER, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., AC 
NO: 20-115D, AIRBORNE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ASSURANCE USING 
EUROCAE ED-12( ) AND RTCA DO-178( ) (2017), https://www.faa.gov/ 
documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_20-115D.pdf. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
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performance and fault tolerant objectives that must be met.174 At 
higher levels of software classification the achievement of those 
objectives must be independently verified by persons other than 
those who coded the software.175 
Despite the robust oversight afforded by the certification and software 
design process, the interconnectivity of the aircraft AASD as shown in 
Figure 3 still leaves it vulnerable to cyber-threats. In 2014 the FAA 
responded by issuing policy guidance on the certification of aircraft and 
equipment. That guidance states that connectivity to “non-
governmental” services not otherwise accredited for secure operations 
may trigger additional certification steps.176 In particular, the FAA will 
issue special conditions for the certification of aircraft or systems that 
directly connect to external services and networks under the following 
conditions: (a) The external service is non-governmental; (b) The aircraft 
system receives information from the non-governmental service or 
network; and (c) The failure effect classification of the aircraft system is 
“major” or higher.177 
AASD systems that only receive data from the aircraft and do 
not transmit data to the aircraft are exempt from these provisions.178 
The FAA explicitly states that this policy guidance does not 
constitute additional regulation. Yet the FAA fails to provide 
examples of special conditions or describe how the design of 
impacted AASD will be evaluated. 
The policy guidance as understood thus addresses at least those 
AASD cyber-vulnerabilities arising from the receipt by the aircraft 
of a corrupted signal or inaccurate data carried by such a signal. It is 
less clear how well the guidance addresses the fault tolerance of 
component equipment aboard the aircraft, or how resistant this 
equipment should be to the introduction of malware. 
Notably, the policy guidance leaves untouched existing FAA 
Rules and Orders pertaining to field loadable software, digital 
                                                
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 SUSAN J. M. CABLER, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., PS-
AIR-21.16-02, ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR CYBER SECURITY 
(2014), https://www.icao.int/cybersecurity/SiteAssets/FAA/PS-AIR-21.16-
02.pdf. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
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signatures and certificates for loadable software, FAA Order 
8100.49 pertaining to design approval for software, and Spec 42 
defining industry standards for digital information security.179 These 
standards specify the fault tolerant and fail-safe design and 
operating characteristics of software embedded within equipment, 
according to the criticality of its function. Through these additional 
mechanisms, the FAA mitigates the risk of improper operation of 
aircraft equipment due to cyber malfeasance. 
Despite the rigor of the certification process and the policy 
guidance, those processes do not mitigate or anticipate all threats. In 
November of 2016, the FAA received a report from the agency’s 
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.180 That report, which 
was not made public, is believed to have cited additional 
cybersecurity concerns and to have recommended the partitioning 
of onboard aircraft data networks into separate domains.181 For 
example, noncritical networks such as in-flight entertainment, 
would be implemented on a separate data network from the AMSS 
data network used for communications with air traffic control. 
Modern designs currently utilize this best practice, but regulations 
do not mandate its use. 
Threats from suppliers are not dealt with explicitly, other than 
possibly via apart through a production certificate. For example, 
software may be designed and certified in compliance with FAA 
guidance, but testing may not reveal malware embedded by 
suppliers and set to execute at a later date. The detection of such 
unauthorized code depends on the robustness of the testing 
protocols, and the manufacturer’s voluntary supplier qualifications 
and oversight. 
The FAA approaches the accreditation of aviation professionals 
in a manner similar to that used by the Coast Guard in the maritime 
domain. Personnel with the potential to impact aviation safety are 
                                                
 179 Id. at 1. 
 180 Woodrow Bellamy III, Senators Reintroduce Aircraft Cyber Security 
Legislation, AVIONICS (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.aviationtoday.com/ 
2017/03/24/senators-reintroduce-aircraft-cyber-security-legislation/. 
 181 Id. 
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both vetted and acredited directly by the Agency or as part of the 
certification requirements of their employer.182 In addition to the 
FAA regulations governing the certification of pilots, mechanics, 
dispatchers, flight attendants, and other key operations personnel, 
FAA airport design criteria also mandate physical controls to limit 
access to the airport and aircraft environment.183 These accreditation 
regulations and controls provide the ancillary benefits of reducing 
cyber threats by restricting physical access to vulnerable aircraft 
systems and prescreening personnel working in the vicinity of 
AASD once installed. 
2. Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Operations 
In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress 
mandated that the FAA safely and expediently integrate unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS) into the national airspace system.184 In 
response, the FAA defined three classes of UAS: 
(a)  unregulated hobbyist or recreational activities for aircraft weighing 
less than fifty-five (55) pounds,185 
(b) regulated commercial UAS operations for remote-piloted aircraft 
weighing less than fifty-five pounds,186 and 
(c) Section 333 exemptions required for unmanned aircraft fifty-five 
pounds or greater, or for other deviations from any regulation governing 
UAS and their operations.187 
Only one of these aforementioned classes of UAS is truly 
pertinent to cyber security concerns. Small, commercial UAS 
operations under Part 107 or hobbyist activities must be conducted 
with the aircraft in visual sight.188 Thus, other than utilization of GPS 
                                                
 182 See 14 C.F.R. pts. 60–68 (2018) (regarding Airmen); see also 14 C.F.R 
§ 139.203 (citing certain personnel training, record keeping, and access controls 
required for airport certification). 
 183 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 139, for airport certification requirements. 
 184 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 
11 (2012). 
 185 14 C.F.R. §§ 101.41, .43. 
 186 14 C.F.R pt. 107. 
 187 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333, 
126 Stat. 11, 75–77. 
 188 14 C.F.R. § 107.31 (requiring the remote pilot in command or visual 
observer to have the unmanned aircraft in visual sight at all times unless a waiver 
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navigation services, such operations are unlikely to be consumers of 
AMSS or otherwise coupled to a communications network. 
Although their flight control systems are highly automated, the 
hazards resulting from compromise of these aircraft are likely 
benign. UAS operations conducted under Section 333 exemptions 
or under a certificate of operation, however, may extend beyond 
visual line of sight or be of such a size and scale that they do not 
constitute a connected AASD as shown in Figure 4.189 
 
 
While many larger UAS are operated as government aircraft 
subject to special additional sensitivities and regulations beyond the 
scope of this paper, several, civil, applications of such large UAS 
presently exist. Private commercial UAS operations include: long-
duration scientific monitoring, land and crop surveys, pipeline and 
                                                
is obtained). In addition, current UAS rely on line of sight radio communications 
for aircraft control. 
 189  See SUSAN J. M. CABLER, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CYBERSECURITY & 
MITIGATIONS (2017), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/event_archive 
/2017_uas_symposium/media/Workshop_2_Cybersecurity.pdf, for the image 
Figure 4 is based upon. 
Figure 3: Components of Connected UAS 
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powerline monitoring, and airborne communications relays.190 
Future use of such systems will continue to expand to potentially 
include the delivery of medicines and other goods, or the transport 
of people.191 Therefore, the cybersecurity of their equipment and 
operations presents a legitimate concern. 
Like manned aircraft systems, both the unmanned aircrafts and 
its operations must each comply with applicable regulations. For 
large UAS, three pathways to aircraft certification exist. An 
unmanned aircraft may receive type certification and a standard 
airworthiness certificate just like any manned aircraft.192 The 
unmanned aircraft can opt to receive a special airworthiness 
certificate in the experimental category under 14 CFR § 21.191, if 
the anticipated use involves research and development, crew 
training, or market surveys.193 
 
                                                
 190 A Civil Future for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NASA (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nasa.gov/aeroresearch/programs/iasp/uas/civil-future-for-uas. 
 191 See, e.g., KITTY HAWK, https://kittyhawk.aero/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) 
(proposing a semi-autonomous personal aircraft and an air taxi). 
 192 14 C.F.R §§ 21.17(b), .25. 
 193 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PUBLIC GUIDANCE FOR PETITIONS FOR EXEMPTION 
FILED UNDER SECTION 333 at 1 (2014) [hereinafter SECTION 333], 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition
/media/section333_public_guidance.pdf. 
Figure 4: UAS Cyber-Vulnerability Overview 
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The certification of both the aircraft and its onboard systems is 
therefore similar to that described above for manned aircraft, 
including the applicability of special conditions as mandated by PS-
AIR-21.16-02. However, the FAA acknowledges that the risk 
calculus embedded within the regulations and policy guidance for 
manned aircrafts may not scale appropriately for unmanned 
aircrafts.194 Figure 5 illustrates the vulnerabilities of large UAS to 
cyber-attacks and security deficiencies. 
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, several potential risks exist when 
the UAS relies on command signals or operation and critical data 
received or provided via AMSS.195 As in the maritime and manned 
aeronautical systems domains, these risks include jamming or 
interference with the signal, corruption of the data embedded within 
the signal, and corruption of the onboard systems which process 
such signals. Each of these vulnerabilities could adversely impact 
the aircraft’s ability to aviate, navigate, or communicate. In a 
manned aircraft, however, a human pilot can directly observe and 
intervene in aircraft operations with less data latency than a remote 
pilot can. A human pilot may also possess a greater number of 
options for directly controlling the aircraft, overriding autonomous 
systems, or supplanting signal data with their own observations. 
Conversely, in certain UAS operations, such as those occurring at 
low level in remote or unpopulated areas, the consequences of such 
vulnerabilities may not pose a hazard to life or property at all. For 
these reasons, the FAA appears to implicitly acknowledge that the 
risk exposure for UAS differ from manned aircraft and that cyber 
risk policies appropriate for manned aircraft might not be 
appropriate for UAS.196 Therefore, although aircraft and equipment 
certification processes remain a valid mechanism for addressing 
cyber-security issues within a UAS, management of cybersecurity 
risks must place additional emphasis on mitigation practices during 
flight operations. 
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Civil operators of unmanned aircraft, not otherwise covered by 
the small UAS operating rules of Part 107, must petition for a 
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization197 or obtain a certificate of 
operation to legally conduct operations.198 The requirements for 
obtaining a certificate of operation are the same as those previously 
discussed in connection with the regulations governing certification 
of manned aircraft operations.199 Certification of Waiver and 
Authorization constitutes ad-hoc applications for relief from certain 
FAA regulations or airworthiness certification requirements.200 
Thus, the precise content of these applications varies between 
applicants and the operations they envision. A review of a sample 
Section 333 Certificate of Authorization (COA) application reveals 
that the applicant must describe the actions to be taken in the event 
that communications links are lost either with the aircraft or between 
the remote pilot, air traffic control, or members of the flight crew.201 
The information requested by the sample application therefore 
addresses the risks due to the jamming or complete loss of a 
communications signal, but does not address the corruption of data 
transmitted by such signal. Nor does the suggested application 
specifically address the possibility that malware aboard the aircraft 
might corrupt the processing of the received data, or cause the 
transmission of the erroneous data. Unlike in the maritime domain, 
there does not appear to be a formal discussion, requirement, or 
emphasis on securing access to key aircraft systems once those 
systems are approved as part of the aircraft certification.202 
                                                
 197 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333, 
126 Stat. 11, 75–77 (2012). 
 198 14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 135, 121. The author notes that some UAS proposals 
include the transport of persons. 
 199 Id. 
 200 SECTION 333, supra note 193, at 4. 
 201 Sample: FAA UAS Civil COA Request Form, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition
/media/FAA_UAS_Civil_COA_Request_v2.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 202 The omission of this type of information from the sample application does 
not preclude the FAA from requesting it if the agency deems it necessary to fully 
evaluate the safety of the proposed operation. 
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3. Proposed Legislation and Additional Rules 
In May 2017, Senators Edward Markey and Richard Blumenthal 
introduced legislation titled Cybersecurity Standards for Aircraft to 
Improve Resilience Act of 2017 (aka. Cyber AIR Act). The Bill 
requires that air carriers, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft 
equipment manufacturers disclose to the FAA any “attempted or 
successful cyberattack” against any aircraft or ground support 
system.203 Notably, the Bill does not address the potential liability of 
such a disclosure, nor does the Bill mandate disclosure via the 
Department of Homeland Security’s existing process. As previously 
noted, the sharing of cyber-threat information among ecosystem 
participants can be beneficial in defending the larger system against 
attack. Industry participants, however, remain concerned that such 
information could subject them to liability, regulatory sanction, or 
the manipulations of an untrustworthy competitor.204 The Bill as 
drafted is unlikely to illicit the support and cooperation of the 
aviation community for these reasons. 
The Bill additionally requires that all electronic entry points to 
the aircraft or ground systems be hardened against cyber-attack and 
that such measures be periodically evaluated for effectiveness, and 
changes be made to such measures if warranted by the evaluation 
results.205 Such a broad regulation may be too divorced from 
tailoring the measure to the risk presented. For example, an 
unmanned aircraft operating over the ocean waters of the United 
States, may present no risk of harm even if compromised by a cyber 
incident. 
Finally, the Bill requires the FAA to work with the FCC, The 
Department of Homeland Security, and The National Intelligence 
Community to incorporate cybersecurity requirements into 
requirements for an air carrier operating certificate or an aircraft 
production certificate.206 As discussed above, existing FAA rules 
                                                
 203 Cybersecurity Standards for Aircraft to Improve Resilience Act of 2017, S. 
679, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017). 
 204 See, e.g., COUNCIL V, FINAL REPORT 3, supra note 119; Eamon Javers, 
Cyberattacks: Why Companies Keep Quiet, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2013, 1:45 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/id/100491610. 
 205 S. 679 § 4(b). 
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focus predominately on certification of the aircraft and aircraft 
subsystems, and on the aviation operations themselves. Certain FAA 
rules, such as PS-AIR 21.16-02, do not rise to the level of formal 
regulation. None of the FAA cybersecurity rules discussed pertain 
to the operating certificate of the airline or the aircraft manufacturer. 
Including such entities within the scope of the cyber regulatory 
scheme would enable a more comprehensive approach along the 
lines of that advocated by the Coast Guard in the maritime domain. 
Such an approach would expand the focus of cybersecurity beyond 
the physical realm of the aircraft and its systems to include risks 
present in production and in the physical operating environment of 
the aircraft. At present, the Bill has been introduced with no action 
taken.207 
D. Cybersecurity Regulation of AASD in the Automobile Industry 
The regulation of cybersecurity for surface transportation 
belongs to various constituent agencies within the U.S. Department 
of Transportation.208 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Association 
makes rules related to commercial vehicle operations “largely 
focused on addressing human driver training, issues of human driver 
fatigue, hours of service, rest and meal stops.”209 As such, this 
                                                
 207 The Cyber AIR Act has been introduced in the Senate as S.679 and in the 
House as H.R. 2997. The Senate bill has been referred to Committee. S.679 - 
Cyber AIR Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/679?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.679 
%22%5D%7D&r=1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). The House has issued a 
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Century AIRR Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
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22H.R.+2997%22%5D%7D&r=1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). 
 208 See 49 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2018) (establishing the DOT and its constituent 
agencies); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR 
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 209 Eric Miller, Chao Tells Automated Vehicle Summit DOT “3.0” Guidance 
Could be Issued in Early Summer, TRANSP. TOPICS (Mar. 1, 2018, 7:15 PM), 
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agency manages vehicle safety primarily through workplace rules 
and human factors. One can therefore reasonably believe its 
influence on the cybersecurity of vehicular transportation is 
negligible at this time. The Federal Railroad Administration is 
tasked with enforcing the nation’s railroad safety laws via rail safety 
regulations.210 This agency only recently began surveying the 
industry to better understand the future of AASD within the rail 
system.211 The Federal Highway Administration conducts research 
and promulgates regulations pertaining to highway design, traffic 
control devices, and highway-related aspects of pedestrian safety.212 
Although this agency concerns itself with the cybersecurity of the 
roadway infrastructure, the agency largely works in cooperation 
with its sister agency the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) in such efforts.213 The National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration is the agency with responsibility for 
all motor vehicle safety regardless of the degree of automation.214 
Congress recognized the potential to create a jumble of 
uncoordinated cybersecurity regulatory efforts within the surface 
transportation sector. In March 2018, Congress passed legislation 
directing the Department of Transportation to develop a 
comprehensive plan to better manage initiatives pertaining to 
                                                
guidance-could-be-issued-early-summer (quoting Steven Bradbury, DOT general 
counsel); see 49 U.S.C. § 113 (2000). 
 210 49 U.S.C. § 103 (2011). 
 211  Automation in the Railroad Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 12,646 (proposed Mar. 
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AASD.215 In response, the Department of Transportation published 
its Comprehensive Management Plan for Automated Vehicle 
Initiatives, and promised to issue in the later months of 2018 an 
additional document titled: Preparing for the Future of 
Transportation: Automated Vehicles 3.0.216 When developing this 
latest document, the Department plans to build upon the policy and 
regulatory approaches currently articulated in  NHTSA Automated 
Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety .217 Because of the degree 
of economic activity surrounding autonomous cars, and the 
influence the NHTSA exerts on current and future DOT 
cybersecurity policy, this section focuses its analysis on the NHTSA 
AASD regulatory scheme. 
In its oversight of motor vehicle safety, the NHTSA employs a 
combination of two regulatory tools: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards (FMVSS) and recall of unsafe vehicles.218 In practice, 
automobile manufacturers self-certify that they comply with the 
FMVSS before placing an automobile into public use.219 The 
NHTSA then randomly tests deployed vehicles to verify compliance 
with the FMVSS.220 If tests reveal that a manufacturer’s vehicle is 
noncompliant or presents a safety hazard, then the agency exercises 
its authority to recall the vehicle.221 In actuality, the agency initiates 
                                                
 215 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141 (2018), provided 
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few recall cases.222 The manufacturers self-initiate most recalls 
before the agency needs to exercise its recall authority.223 
To date, the agency has not issued any FMVSS regarding 
cybersecurity.224 In 2017, the NHTSA published industry guidance 
concerning the regulation of autonomous vehicles and vehicles 
containing automated systems.225 That guidance specifically 
eschews promulgation of formal regulations in favor of voluntary 
compliance with 12 priority safety design elements.226 
Safety design element 7 addresses cybersecurity matters.227 In its 
guidance to industry, the agency “encourages,” but does not 
mandate, certain practices.228 Specifically, NHTSA encourages 
entities to design automation using “established best practices for 
cyber vehicle physical systems,” including those established by 
NIST, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of Global Automakers, 
the Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and other 
relevant agencies.229 The agency further encourages entities to 
document their compliance with such standards as well as their 
design choices in mitigating cyber risks.230 But notably, unlike the 
Coast Guard’s approach, the agency does not require such actions—
even for systems that might impact safety of life. The agency only 
advocates for submission of a voluntary safety self-assessment.231 
Thus, the regulated entity has complete discretion over whether to 
engage in any of these recommended behaviors—or not. 
Also noteworthy is the distinction between the FAA’s regulatory 
approach to aircraft and aviation systems and that taken by The 
Department of Transportation its sister agency, NHTSA, with 
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respect to surface vehicles. Although the FAA exercises its 
oversight via mandatory regulation, policy guidance, and advisory 
circulars; every aircraft, manned or unmanned, must either come 
within a Rule exemption or meet certification standards and obtain 
an airworthiness certificate prior to entering service.232 Individual 
systems and pieces of equipment must also meet certification 
standards either via a Technical Standards Order, or Supplemental 
Type Certificate before being installed on an aircraft.233 The NHTSA 
would, presumably, not permit a patently unsafe automated vehicle 
from entering into service, but its exclusive reliance on its recall 
authority is remarkable. 
In the past, use of the recall authority coexisted with an 
enforceable FMVSS. In the realm of cybersecurity, however, none 
exist. The agency’s justification for its approach is therefore also 
noteworthy. The NHTSA states that the purpose of the voluntary 
guidance is: “to support the automotive industry, the States, and 
other key stakeholders . . . .”234 Although safety is acknowledged in 
passing as an agency responsibility, the Department of 
Transportation’s voluntary guidance does not explicitly reference 
the agency’s congressional mandate to provide “fast, safe, efficient, 
and convenient transportation.”235 The agency’s other stated 
objective vis a vis the public is to support public trust and confidence 
in the safety of AASD by encouraging, but not requiring, the 
regulated entities to disclose voluntary self-assessments and their 
methodologies for achieving safety.236 
The stated justification for this somewhat laissez faire approach 
is to promote the introduction of potentially life-saving automation 
while not impeding the innovation necessary to achieve it.237 
Commenters have noted other possible benefits to this approach. 
                                                
 232 14 C.F.R. ch. I (2018). 
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Specifically, this approach allows for diverse responses to 
cybersecurity threats and prevents the emergence of a cyber 
monoculture where vulnerabilities are uniform across the system.238 
Despite these potential advantages, the agency’s sole reliance on 
voluntary compliance with consensus standards also has numerous 
drawbacks. Voluntary industry standards, although advanced by 
those with specialized technical expertise, leave no voice for the 
consumer or the public in their formation. Additionally, in certain 
technical fields, such as telecommunications, consensus standards 
bodies have sometimes earned a reputation for being unwieldy 
political entities capable of being captured and controlled by a savvy 
player or one with a dominant intellectual property position239 Thus, 
the technical solutions adopted by such groups may or may not be 
the optimal approach to the problem addressed. Furthermore, merely 
encouraging compliance with a standard is a far cry from requiring 
that a device actually attains the performance achievable via that 
standard. 
No doubt in other sectors, such as aerospace, policy standards 
bodies have successfully worked to advance common 
understandings of technically appropriate solutions to shared 
problems. The FAA has routinely turned to ARINC, the RTCA, the 
SAE, and other standards bodies for solutions to stated problems.240 
But, the FAA employs consensus standards in an entirely different 
manner than NHSTA. The FAA utilizes consensus standards as an 
acceptable means to demonstrate conformance with an existing 
safety rule.241 This approach also enables the public to comment on 
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comments on the use of 30 published consensus standards as a means for 
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the suitability of the standard since it forms a part of the agency’s 
rule making activities.242 
In the realm of motor vehicles, however, the NHTSA merely 
encourages voluntary compliance with consensus standards in a 
manner decoupled from any FMVSS, the agency’s rulemaking 
process, or agency verification of compliance.243 
Presumably, the consensus standards cited by the NHTSA could 
also serve as a basis for establishing negligent design in product 
liability cases. A failure to adhere to an acceptable consensus 
standard may be grounds for establishing a negligent design unless 
the automaker could document a rationale for the deviation. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the NHTSA guidance strongly 
discourages states from implementing their own regulations.244 The 
NHTSA document states: “NHTSA strongly encourages States not 
                                                
standards, promulgated by the American Society for Testing and Materials 
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by the FAA. The FAA uses voluntary consensus standards as an optional means 
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the framework of OMB Circular A-119. The NHTSA merely encourages 
voluntary adoption of voluntary consensus standards. 
 244 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 10, at 3, 18, 20, 21. 
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to codify this Voluntary Guidance (that is, incorporate it into State 
statutes) as a legal requirement for any phases of development, 
testing or deployment of ADSs [Automated Driving Systems].”245 
While acknowledging elsewhere that the regulation of liability 
remains with the States, strict adherence to this admonition would 
prevent states from formally incorporating the voluntary guidelines 
and standards into any formal definition of defective design. Such a 
prohibition would effectively gut the ability for product liability law 
to serve as an incentive for the desired cyber-secure behaviors. 
The totality of the NHTSA approach, especially when contrasted 
with the regulatory approaches taken by other agencies, suggests a 
regulatory body captured by the industry it is intended to regulate. 
For perhaps this reason, or in response to the specific drawbacks 
noted above, current legislation pending in Congress would make 
the now voluntary self-assessment of compliance with these 
standards compulsory while prohibiting the States from levying 
additional design standards.246 In addition, each proposed bill 
requires mandatory cybersecurity plans from automobile 
manufacturers documenting their process for identifying and 
mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attack.247 The regulatory scheme 
advanced by the proposed legislation tracks the regulatory scheme 
implemented by the Coast Guard in the maritime domain, and 
appears to be a reasonable compromise to compel and ensure 
automakers actually work through cybersecurity issues in a 
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 246 See AV Start Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. 
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comprehensive way. In addition, this approach would ensure that 
cyber failures potentially impacting safety of life are presented in a 
manner over which the agency can exert its oversight authority prior 
to the occurrence of an accident. 
The voluntary guidelines advanced by NHTSA also address 
disclosure of cyber incidents. Entities are encouraged to report to the 
Automotive Information and Analysis Center, or other relevant 
organizations, all discovered incidents, threats, exploits, and 
vulnerabilities from internal testing, consumer reporting, or external 
research.248 This private industry group, formed in 2015, established 
a global information sharing community to track vehicle cyber-
security risks.249 According to the group’s web-pages, membership 
encompasses over 99 percent of light-duty vehicles in North 
America, with over 30 global original equipment manufacturers and 
suppliers.250 Information submitted to this industry collaborative is 
anonymized and shared with other members, a key component of 
the collaborative architecture being the confidentiality of the 
disclosing member.251 No government agency or law enforcement 
organization has access to the submitted data without the approval 
of the disclosing party, although the agency claims that it will work 
cooperatively with the government on a need-to-know basis and 
with the approval of the industry member.252 Presumably, the 
information could be subpoenaed. Such a process is not only costly 
and time consuming, but also implies that some aggrieved party has 
already suffered a harm for which redress is sought. 
The Department of Transportation therefore recognizes the 
benefits that collaborative learning brings to the reduction of cyber 
vulnerabilities, but has introduced a significant barrier to its own 
edification of ongoing trends and developments. The data remains 
entirely within the complete control of a private industry group with 
no obligation to share its findings, observations or research with the 
government. Unlike the system for critical infrastructure in use at 
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DHS, the government possesses no mechanism that provides 
visibility into emergent cyber-security issues or the effectiveness of 
the aggregate industry response. Yet again, such disclosures are only 
voluntary and not mandatory. As a result, the safety decision making 
function has been completely ceded to the industry participants. 
Unlike aviation, the driving public is left without any meaningful 
independent arbiter of or enforcer of the necessary safety behaviors. 
The significance of this position cannot be understated. Unlike 
previous iterations of automotive automation, cyber compromise of 
current AASD doesn’t just create consumer inconvenience, it 
impacts safety of life. 
E. Remote Sensing: NOAA Licensing and Operating Rules 
The remote satellite sensing systems licensed by NOAA are 
indirectly relevant to the regulation of AASD in the transportation 
sector. AASD may consume processed data and services provided 
by remote sensing technology but they currently do not directly 
communicate with or process the raw data output from such 
systems.253 Contemporary remote sensing systems downlink the 
observed data back to a fixed base ground station for further data 
processing and subsequent distribution to the end user or AASD.254 
An examination of the cybersecurity regulations pertaining to 
remote sensing systems is meritorious primarily as an investigation 
into an alternative cybersecurity regulatory scheme, although 
corruption of the remote observation data provided to the AASD is 
also of concern. 
Operators of commercial space-based remote sensing satellite 
systems must obtain a license from the U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration pursuant to the National and 
Commercial Space Programs Act.255 Review of the specific license 
                                                
 253 The Use of Satellite Remote Sensing to Study the Human Dimensions of 
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requirements documented in the corresponding regulations finds 
cybersecurity addressed via two separate provisions.256 The first, 
most directly applicable provision, mandates that all licensees 
submit a “Data Protection Plan,” describing the licensee’s plan to 
protect data and information through the entire cycle of tasking, 
operations, processing, archiving and dissemination.257 “At a 
minimum, this includes appropriate protection of communications 
links and/or delivery methods for tasking of the satellite, 
downloading of data to a ground station . . . , and delivery of data 
from the satellite to the licensee’s central data storage facilities.”258 
In 2008, NOAA published informal guidance in the form of a 
“Licensee Data Protection Plan Template,” that outlines in greater 
detail the types of information licensees should include in their 
plans.259 Table 1 documents the key elements to be included. 
 
Spacecraft Communications 
Links to/from 
Spacecraft 
Ground 
Segment 
Entire 
System 
Orbits No. of Channels Physical site 
and physical 
access 
controls to 
site 
Description of 
system 
architecture 
Equipment 
performance 
capabilities  
Frequency of and 
data conveyed via 
each channel 
Personnel 
security 
Overview of 
data 
protection 
strategy 
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ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA LICENSEE DATA PROTECTION TEMPLATE (2002), 
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Pointing 
capability 
Encryption used on 
each channel 
Data storage 
and 
protection 
practices 
Methods for 
complying 
with U.S. 
Government 
requests for 
and allowable 
uses of data. 
 Encryption key 
management plan 
Data 
transmittal 
process to 
end users 
 
 Description of how 
data is processed 
from raw to 
enhanced state 
Security and 
encryption 
to end users 
 
Table 1: NOAA Data Protection Plan Template 
 
Examination of the plan elements reveals that the anticipated 
protection schemes address protections to ensure the proper 
acquisition and dissemination of the data. Specific elements of the 
plan pertaining to the performance and pointing characteristics of 
spacecraft sensors address masking sensitive troop movements, and 
complying with statutory obligations concerning sensing of Israel.260 
Elements of the plan requiring encryption of data and control signals 
not only protect against unauthorized collection of data, but also 
seek to prevent against access to the data by unauthorized persons. 
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Absent from the plan, therefore, are any of the comprehensive, 
NIST-like, analyses that identify and mitigate cyber-security risks 
unrelated to data collection and use. For example, the plan template 
and regulations neither suggest nor require controls of the suppliers 
and services providers or any risk analysis of same. The plan 
template neither suggests nor requires positive mitigation of risks 
that the spacecraft could be damaged or lost due to the corruption of 
onboard equipment. The plan template does not address the 
possibility that an encrypted and correctly formatted control signal 
might be received by the spacecraft that commands it to operate in 
an undesired or even self-destructive way. The encryption of 
transmitted packets, site access, and personnel security as required 
by the plan do mitigate this risk, but these steps fail to account for 
additional sources of risk. Specifically, the acquisition of ground 
antennae and ground station operations by secondary suppliers 
removes the owner/operators of the satellite from direct oversight of 
certain operational aspects. The remote data service provider does 
not appear to be required to mandate either by contract or other 
means the protection of encryption keys or the appropriate access to 
data as applicable. Review of some publicly searchable plans 
indicates plan details do not reach this depth of holistic risk 
assessment and mitigation. 
Despite these apparent gaps in the data plan template, the second 
of the two NOAA licensing regulations may indirectly address those 
security items left unspecified by the template itself.261 Rule 960.11 
requires that operators of remote sensing satellites maintain 
operational control of the satellite from the United States at all 
times.262 Operational control is defined to mean “the ability to 
operate the system or override commands issued by any operations 
center or station.”263 Wherein “[o]perate means to manage, run, 
authorize, control, or otherwise affect the functioning of a remote 
sensing space system, directly or through an affiliate or subsidiary. 
This includes: (1) Commanding, controlling, tasking, and 
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navigation of the system; or (2) Data acquisition, storage, 
processing, and dissemination.”264 Additional licensing instructions 
direct the applicant to describe those methods used to ensure the 
integrity of operations including positive control of the space 
system, operations centers, and ground stations.265 There appears 
little more needed to establish this capability beyond the type of 
information required by the data protection plan. This Rule, 
however, may serve as an additional authority to strengthen license 
requirements in response to the changing cybersecurity threat 
environment. 
Additional NOAA regulatory provisions bear upon 
cybersecurity, although not directly. Licenses for commercial 
remote systems are also subject to review by the Department of 
State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Interior, 
and the Intelligence Community.266 These additional agencies may 
review the licensing package for compliance with “international 
obligations, foreign policy concerns, or national security 
concerns.”267 Such reviews might flag additional cyber-security 
issues; however, the scope of such reviews and their particulars 
remain ambiguous. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Private law incentives to compel cyber-secure behaviors in the 
transportation sector exist but are insufficient to achieve vigilance. 
Unequal bargaining power and broad disclaimers of warranties and 
liabilities limit meaningful negotiation over the allocation of cyber-
security risks via contact. Insurance, which could serve as a 
mechanism to incentivize cybersecurity through oversight of risk 
mitigation practices, typically excludes cyber-related incidents from 
coverage. Hence, insurers do not exert much influence in promoting 
cyber-secure design and best practices. 
Product liability law remains a promising avenue for 
incentivizing the manufacturers of AASD to engage in design and 
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production behaviors that both reduces exposure to and mitigates the 
consequences of cyber-security events. Product liability law is 
maturing, but proving that the harm resulted from a faulty design or 
failure to warn remains difficult and problematic. The formal 
advocacy of adherence to voluntary consensus standards by some 
agencies should be augmented by either: 
(a) allowing those consensus standards with which an agency 
encourages voluntary compliance to serve as admissible evidence of 
competent design, a deviation from which can serve as a rebuttable 
basis for product liability under state laws; and clearly stating use of 
standards for this purpose is not federally preempted, or 
(b) promulgating formal safety regulations that allow 
conformance with the cited standard to serve as one mechanism for 
compliance with the rule; and wherein failure to comply with the 
formal regulation could then serve as a basis for product liability 
under state laws. 
Manufacturers and the providers of services are in the best 
positions to anticipate, prevent, and mitigate the harms of cyber 
malfeasance by others. Product liability law should therefore be 
clarified and strengthened, perhaps at least through proposed 
updates to the restatement. 
Given the relatively weak ability of private law mechanisms to 
incentivize cyber-secure behaviors, turning to public law solutions 
such as legislation and regulation appears appropriate. Existing U.S. 
regulations, however, are a jumble of varied approaches by different 
oversight agencies. A review of the regulations pertinent to AASD 
in the transportation sector reveals very different regulatory choices 
among agencies in five key areas of cybersecurity oversight. 
Table 2 compares the different approaches taken by each of the 
relevant agencies. Close inspection of Table 2 exposes that one 
entire segment of an interconnected AASD lacks any cybersecurity 
regulatory oversight whatsoever. The absence of any FCC statutory 
authority to exercise cybersecurity oversight means that there are no 
compulsory behaviors related to the communications backbone of 
any AASD. This omission is the most notable in the space 
component of any satellite communications network. While other 
agencies may lack the ability to regulate the communications 
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network, they can, and often do, regulate the terrestrial end user 
terminals and the processing of data provided by such networks. 
Communications nodes and data sources in orbit however, are not 
beyond the reach of hackers. Only new legislation can address this 
key omission in oversight of the nation’s communication 
infrastructure as a component of AASD. 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Regulatory Approaches in Five Key Areas of 
Cybersecurity 
The corollary to these observations also means that no single 
agency will ever have a sufficient span of authority to manage 
system and equipment cyber threats across all AASD network 
segments. This fact indicates the desirability for some degree of 
alignment and coordination of approaches across agencies. 
Although the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast 
Guard engage in efforts to share cybersecurity best practices and 
strategies across federal agencies, such laudable work results only 
in exchanges of information and cannot by itself ensure a synergistic 
approach to cybersecurity regulation of AASD as a networked 
 Incident 
Reporting 
Submission of 
Comprehensive 
Cybersecurity Plan 
Licensing or Certification of 
Key Personnel 
Specified Cybersecurity 
Practices 
Verification of Compliance 
FCC X  
Encouraged to 
use DHS 
voluntary 
process 
X Licensing of Carriers X X 
FAA Few are 
mandatory via 
DHS process 
otherwise no 
Some – if ‘special 
conditions’ apply for 
certification 
Credentialing and licensing of: 
Airmen 
Airport personnel 
Mechanics 
Dispatchers 
Operators 
Aircraft and parts   
manufacturers 
Some via: 
Advisory Circulars 
Industry consensus standards 
referenced in STCs, TSOs 
and other certification 
requirements 
Safety Inspections 
Review prior to certification 
USCG Mandatory via 
DHS process 
and regulation 
Mandatory: 
Vessel security 
assessments 
Vessel security plans 
Credentialing and licensing of:  
 Ship’s personnel 
 Vessels 
NIST risk framework Periodic Inspections and audits 
Fines and other penalties for non-
compliance 
NHTSA Voluntary via 
industry trade 
association 
Voluntary X Voluntary compliance with 
industry consensus standards 
Voluntary self-assessments 
Recall authority 
NOAA X Mandatory - Data plan X As stated in guidelines for 
preparation of data plans 
Data plan subject to audit  
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system of systems.268 Congress may wish to consider formally 
directing such agency collaboration either via legislation or via 
exercise of its oversight authority. Such actions would promote 
coordinated and synergistic cybersecurity regulations without 
unduly compromising continued innovation, or disregarding the 
industry-specific nuances of the particular oversight agency. 
Existing differences in regulatory approaches arise more from 
regulatory legacy and less from industry-unique circumstances that 
warrant these distinctions. 
The needed and recommended additional steps, as outlined 
below also recognize the need to distinguish between cyber risks 
that potentially impact safety of life and those that do not. A 
different level of safety oversight should be required of the former, 
while the later, although not insignificant, can be developed with 
less regulatory scrutiny. Specifically, as a result of the review and 
analysis undertaken herein, the following legislative/regulatory 
recommendations are made. 
A. Legislation Regarding Disclosure of Cyber-security Events 
Industry participants all articulate a need for mechanisms to 
share cyber-threat events without fear of liability, regulatory 
retaliation, or competitor abuse. Only certain limited subsets of the 
AASD ecosystem, defined as “critical infrastructure,” can 
participate in the Department of Homeland Security voluntary 
                                                
 268 See, e.g., Maureen D. Johnson, Department of Homeland Security Efforts: 
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OCT. 2018]Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in Transport 191 
programs for sharing such information inclusive of its statutory 
liability protections.269 The definition of “critical infrastructure” 
under the Homeland Security Act is too narrow to encompass all 
transportation AASD activity of interest because that definition 
concerns itself solely with items that, when compromised, have a 
direct and debilitating impact on national security or public health.270 
Therefore, as discussed previously above, while portions of the 
aviation and maritime sectors come within the definition of “critical 
infrastructure, “ this definition also operates to exclude significant 
elements of the AASD communications backbone, the automobile 
industry, and other AASD sub-elements that do not by themselves 
directly bear on national security or public health. Industries and 
AASD network components excluded from the definition of 
“critical infrastructure” do not enjoy the cyber event disclosure 
protections provided by § 214 of the Homeland Security Act. 
The reluctance to share event data for fear of regulatory 
retaliation, competitor abuse of the data, and production in 
discovery therefore persists. The additional voluntary disclosure 
process enabled by Presidential Directive PPD-41 does not 
sufficiently address these concerns. Private industry voluntary 
disclosure organizations are an additional and valuable alternative, 
but do not necessarily provide the government with the 
comprehensive “big picture” intelligence needed to protect the 
country and make sound regulatory and legislative decisions. The 
current reporting mechanisms therefore tend to under-report 
incidents and retard the private sector’s responses and adaptations 
to emerging threats. 
Given the potential benefits to industry participants, the 
insurance sector, and the public, a unified system for sharing cyber-
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event data responsive to these concerns should be implemented. 
Legitimate concern exists that blanket exemption from liability or 
regulatory enforcement could lead to abuse of the disclosure system 
as a means of avoiding accountability for avoidable harms. The 
NASA aviation incident safety reporting mechanism is instructive 
here. That system, in which aviation participants voluntarily 
disclose safety-related incidents and mishaps within a specified time 
interval, has been instrumental in spotting emerging safety concerns 
and issuing timely alerts and recommended responses.271 
The Department of Homeland Security Act should be amended 
to either expand the definition of “critical infrastructure” to include 
the components of AASD used in the transportation sector, or 
optionally establish a mechanism whereby all participants wishing 
to disclose cyber-security events can do so free of liability under 
certain conditions. Under the second, more expansive option, the 
disclosure system should be exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act, and it should be confidential and share information 
with others only in an anonymized and aggregated manner unless 
otherwise permitted by the disclosing party. Much like the NASA 
aviation safety incident reporting, the party sharing information via 
this mechanism should be shielded from regulatory repercussions 
for the events disclosed under certain conditions. Candidate 
provisions for a more expansive disclosure process might include 
protection from regulatory repercussions and from disclosure of the 
submitted material in a civil lawsuit, provided the following 
conditions are true: 
(a) The disclosed event did not result from the criminal or 
willful negligence of the disclosing party, 
(b) The disclosure documenting the event was submitted within 
a specified time frame. 
(c) The disclosing party has on file with the appropriate 
regulatory agency, a comprehensive cyber-security risk mitigation 
                                                
 271 See Linda Connell, Address at the ATEC Safety Reporting Seminar in 
Tokyo, Japan: Aviation Safety Reporting System (Jan. 11, 2011); LINDA 
CONNELL, NASA, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM (2011), 
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plan developed in accordance with relevant agency guidelines or a 
consensus standard acceptable to the agency, 
(d) The disclosure as submitted will not be produced in a civil 
lawsuit alleging third party liability in cases where the event 
disclosed did not result in the loss of life, serious bodily harm, or 
permanent disability of a third party, and 
(e) The disclosing party will be shielded from regulatory 
repercussions even in cases involving the violation of any applicable 
agency rule, so long as that violation was not willful or criminal, and 
the disclosure was submitted within the specified time limit. 
The unified disclosure mechanism outlined above would 
encourage divulging cyber event information and would establish a 
predictable set of rules consistent in all industry sectors. The 
Department of Homeland Security is likely the best choice to 
continue to serve as custodian of this information given their 
existing mandate. Optionally, a third, non-regulatory agency or 
private party could serve this function. 
B. Mandatory Submission and Review of Cybersecurity Plans for 
OEMs and Service Providers in the Transportation Sector 
where Failure or Compromise of Products and Services Has 
Potential Safety of Life or Critical Infrastructure 
Consequences. 
Only the maritime sector, via Coast Guard regulation, requires 
entities to submit a comprehensive cyber-security plan.272 When 
AASD cyber failures or attacks have the potential to impact safety 
of life, this relinquishing of safety oversight cannot be justified. 
Requiring submission of a comprehensive plan does not equate to 
over-specifying the technology or mitigating actions to be taken 
under such a plan. The agency, as in the case of the NHTSA, can 
point to multiple sources of best practices for developing a plan, but 
construction and filing of a plan should be mandatory in safety of 
life relevant circumstances. Leaving plan development in the realm 
of a voluntary activity means that there is no assurance that plans 
                                                
 272 33 C.F.R. §§ 104.300, .305, .400 (2018). 
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will even be developed, let alone that their quality is satisfactory, or 
that the plan covers all appropriate threats. 
The only reasonable alternative to the above position, 
certification of manufacturers, and certification that parts and 
equipment have been designed using acceptable best practices or 
technical standards; imposes an even greater burden on industry. As 
in aviation, this model may be the best path for assuring industry 
achieves a minimum level of safety before putting a part or AASD 
into commerce. The FAA has shown that it can retain its regulatory 
oversight while industry remains free to promote and adopt 
appropriate consensus standards regarding cybersecurity 
certification requirements. When safety of life issues exist, deviation 
from this general practice should not be the norm. In the case of self-
driving automobiles, the estimated savings in lives lost to traffic 
accidents --by one account as many as tens of thousands each year—
may justify the expediency of substituting certification for another 
type of compulsory approach.273 The NHSTA’s existing voluntary 
approach puts the public in harm’s way. The NHSTA voluntary 
approach abdicates the agency’s responsibility to safeguard 
members of the public who reasonably are not knowledgeable or 
sophisticated enough to perform this function in the marketplace. 
Even with the FAA’s strong oversight activity, gaps in 
cybersecurity oversight exist. With the possible exception of 
operator and production certificates, the FAA does not require 
submission of a comprehensive cybersecurity plan. Requiring such 
plans of all participants whose AASD have possible safety-of-life 
impacts if compromised would ensure those participants at least 
identify and address cybersecurity risks. 
C. Concluding Remarks 
The recommendations made herein thus ensure critical segments 
of any AASD are subject to cybersecurity oversight and that the key 
elements of a cybersecurity regulatory scheme are in place across all 
relevant agencies. The recommendations provided above do not 
direct agencies to require the adoption of any specific technical 
cybersecurity actions. Agencies remain free to define for themselves 
                                                
 273 See WATNEY & DRAFFIN, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
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or otherwise establish independent sources of cybersecurity best 
practices. The recommended approach thus also avoids calcification 
around a fixed set of remediations and enables a diversity of 
solutions to continuously evolve. By following these 
recommendations, industry participants can therefore remain nimble 
in the face of evolving cyber threats, while ensuring public safety 
through what proves to be needed regulatory oversight.  
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF FCC REGULATIONS RELATING TO 
LICENSING AND OPERATION OF MSS 
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Table A-2: MSS Space Station Licensing Requirements 
 
